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LOGIC PROGRAMMING AND KNOWLEDGE 
REPRESENTATION 
CHITTA BARAL AND MICHAEL GELFOND 
D In this paper, we review recent work aimed at the application of declarative logic 
programming to knowledge representation in artificial intelligence. We consider 
extensions of the language of definite logic programs by classical (strong) negation, 
disjunction, and some modal operators and show how each of the added features 
extends the representational power of the language. 
We also discuss extensions of logic programming allowing abductive reasoning, 
meta-reasoning and reasoning in open domains. We investigate the methodology 
of using these languages for representing various forms of nonmonotonic reasoning 
and for describing knowledge in specific domains. We also address recent work 
on properties of programs needed for sucessful applications of this methodology 
such as consistency, categoricity and complexity. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we review recent work aimed at the application of logic programming to 
knowledge representation in artificial intelligence (AI). We consider various extensions of 
“pure Prolog” (definite logic programs) and show how each of the added features extends 
the representational power of the language. 
1.1. Historical Perspective 
Knowledge representation is one of the most important subareas of artificial intelligence. 
If we want to design an entity (a machine or a program) capable of behaving intelligently 
in some environment, then we need to supply this entity with sufficient knowledge about 
this environment. To do that, we need an unambiguous language capable of expressing this 
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knowledge, together with some precise and well-understood way of manipulating sets of 
sentences of the language which will allow us to draw inferences, answer queries, and to 
update both the knowledge base and the desired program behavior. 
Around 1960, McCarthy [ 1421 first proposed the use of logical formulas as a basis for a 
knowledge representation language of this type. This is how he explains the advantages of 
such a representation: 
Expressing information in declarative sentences is far more modular than 
expressing it in segments of computer programs or in tables. Sentences can 
be true in a much wider context than specific programs can be used. The 
supplier of a fact does not have to understand much about how the receiver 
functions or how or whether the receiver will use it. The same fact can be 
used for many purposes, because the logical consequences of collections of 
facts can be available. 
This idea has been further developed by many researchers with various backgrounds and 
interests. First, the classical logic of predicate calculus served as the main technical tool 
for the representation of knowledge. It has a well-defined semantics and a well-understood 
and powerful inference mechanism, and it proved to be sufficiently expressive for the 
representation of mathematical knowledge. It was soon realized, however, that for the 
representation of commonsense knowledge, this tool is inadequate. The difficulty is rather 
deep and related to the so-called “monotonicity” of theories based on predicate calculus. A 
logic is called monotonic if the addition of new axioms to a theory based on it never leads to 
the loss of any theorems proved in this theory. Commonsense reasoning is nonmonotonic: 
new information constantly forces us to withdraw previous conclusions. This observation 
has led to the development and investigation of new logical formalisms, nonmonotonic 
logics. The best known of them are circumscription [143, 144, 1241, default logic [200], 
and nonmonotonic modal logics [146, 145, 1571. A collection of important papers on 
nonmonotonic reasoning published before 1987 appears in [79]. A survey can be found in 
[202]. Much technical work has been done to investigate the mathematical properties of 
these logics, as well as their applicability to the formalization of commonsense reasoning 
in various specific domains. This work has substantially deepened our understanding of 
the properties of nonmonotonic reasoning and of the technical problems involved in its 
formalization. 
Another direction of research, started by Green [96], Hayes [98], and Kowalski [ 1131 
and continued by many others, combined the idea of logic as a representation language 
with the theory of automated deduction and constructive logic. This led Kowalski and 
Colmerauer to the creation of logic programming [131] and the development of the first 
logic programming language, Prolog [29]. 
Even though logic programming and nonmonotonic logic share many common goals and 
techniques, until recently, there were no strong ties between the two research communities. 
Originally, declarative Prolog was defined as a small subset of predicate calculus. This 
dialect of Prolog is now called “pure” Prolog. The restricted syntax of pure Prolog makes 
it possible to efficiently organize the process of inference, while its semantics relies heav- 
ily on the classical, model-theoretic notion of logical entailment. Unlike nonmonotonic 
logics, with their emphasis on expressiveness, efficiency and development of programming 
methodology seemed to be the main concern of the logic programming community. 
With time, however, Prolog evolved to incorporate some nonclassical, nonmonotonic 
features, which make it closer in spirit to the nonmonotonic logics mentioned above. The 
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most important nonmonotonic feature of modern Prolog is negation as failure [33, 1981. 
The initial definition of this construct was purely procedural, which inhibited its use for 
knowledge representation and software engineering, as well as for the investigation of 
the relationship between logic programming and other nonmonotonic formalisms. Work, 
started by Clark and Reiter in the late 70s was aimed at the development of a declarative 
semantics for logic programs with negation as failure. 
The problem proved to be a rather nontrivial one. After more than ten years of extensive 
investigation, we now have a much better understanding of the problems involved, but 
there is still no universally accepted semantics for logic programs with negation as failure, 
even though for large classes of programs, a certain level of consensus seems to have been 
achieved. The work on the declarative semantics of negation as failure has significantly 
enhanced our understanding of the relationship between nonmonotonic logics and logic 
programming. 
It became apparent, on the other hand, that in order to become satisfactory tools for 
knowledge representation, logic programming languages should be expanded to allow for 
better handling of incomplete information. Work in this direction was started by Minker 
[153], Loveland [134], and others, who investigated the possibility of expanding logic 
programs by disjunctive information. In [81, 196, 781, extensions of logic programming 
by classical (or strong) negation and epistemic operators were suggested. Unlike “tradi- 
tional” nonmonotonic formalisms, these extensions are not based on the use of classical 
logical connectives, and do not include full first-order logic (not even its propositional part). 
Their fairly simple syntactic form may facilitate the adaptation of query-answering methods 
developed in the context of logic programming and deductive databases to more compli- 
cated forms of knowledge representation and reasoning. At the same time, these logic 
programming-based languages are rather expressive. In fact, they are more expressive than 
first-order logic. (See Section IO.) 
From the perspective of knowledge representation, such extensions of traditional logic 
programming have the same status as other nonmonotonic formalisms and should be stud- 
ied as such. This includes the investigation of the methodology of using these languages 
for representing various forms of nonmonotonic reasoning and for describing knowledge 
in specific domains; the mathematical investigation of properties of theories stated in these 
languages, done from the standpoint of their semantics and not necessarily related to any 
particular computational mechanism; development of query-answering systems; and inves- 
tigation of the relationship between logic programming and other knowledge representation 
methods. 
1.2. Structure of the Paper 
In this paper, we discuss some recent work in logic programming which contributes to 
this view. We will not write a comprehensive survey of the field; the paper will reflect 
the authors’ views on what is important, with their preferences and biases, which explains 
the inclusion of large parts of the authors’ own work. This paper does not contain any 
new mathematical result, with the single exception of Proposition 4.1. Many important 
developments are omitted simply because of space and time limitation and/or the inability 
of the authors to incorporate them in the whole picture. We hope, however, that it will 
allow the readers to feel the flavor of the problems involved in using logic programming for 
knowledge representation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider general logic 
programs (also known as normal logic programs) and show how general logic programs 
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can be used to represent knowledge in AI. In particular we consider McCarthy’s [142] 
example of flying birds and the Yale shooting problem [ 1001, and show their formalization 
using general logic programs. We also discuss formalization of normative statements’of 
the kind “As are normally Bs” using general logic programs. Our discussion is based on the 
stable model semantics of general logic programs. We briefly discuss the other semantics 
of general logic programs, and discuss classes of general logic programs where the various 
semantics agree. We also review a method of computing the stable models of a general 
logic program. 
In Section 3, we consider extended logic programs [82, 2361 that allow classical nega- 
tion (also referred to as “strong negation”), and discuss its expressibility in the context of 
knowledge representation. We reformalize McCarthy’s example of flying birds and the 
Yale shooting problem using extended logic programs, and show the utility of using ex- 
tended logic programs in the presence of incomplete information where the closed world 
assumption (CWA) [ 1981 cannot be assumed automatically. 
In Section 4, we consider disjunctive logic programs where disjunctions are allowed in 
the heads of the rules of the program. We formalize two examples from the literature. In 
particular, we consider an example from [ 18 I] that was used to demonstrate the difficulties 
associated with representing disjunctive information in Reiter’s default logic. We also 
discuss other semantics of general logic programs, and review a method to compute the 
answer set semantics of a disjunctive logic program. 
In Section 5, we show the inadequacy of disjunctive logic programs in representing 
certain kinds of information, and introduce two new unary operators K (meaning known) 
and M (meaning may be believed). The extension of disjunctive logic programs by these 
operators called epistemic logic programs) is used to overcome this inadequacy. 
In Section 6, we consider the framework of meta-logic programming and discuss several 
of its features. In particular, we discuss an application of results related to logic program- 
ming semantics to proving correctness of simple meta-interpreters for logic programs. We 
also consider several meta-logic programs that formalize database updates and hypothetical 
reasoning. 
In Section 7, we discuss the modification of the semantics of logic programs and disjunc- 
tive databases which allows for reasoning in the absence of the domain-closure assumption 
[ 1991. This modification increases the expressive power of the language, and allows one to 
explicitly state the domain<losure and other assumptions about the domain of discourse 
in the language of logic programming. 
In Section 8, we discuss alogic programming language based on abduction. We then dis- 
cuss abduction as a formalism for explanation of observations, and describe the connection 
between abduction and negation as failure. 
In Section 9, we discuss the relationship between the logic programming-based for- 
malisms discussed in the previous sections and various nonmonotonic logics developed 
in artificial intelligence, such as circumscription, default logic, autoepistemic logic, and 
truth maintenance systems. In Section 10, we discuss the complexity and expressibility of 
logic programming languages, and in Section 11, we conclude by mentioning some further 
problems that need to be addressed. 
‘Normative or normic statements [217, 2181 frequently involve terms such as “naturally,” “normally,” 
“typically,” “tendency,” “ought,” “should,” and others. 
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2. GENERAL LOGIC PROGRAMS 
2.1. Preliminaries 
The language of a logic program, like a first-order language, is determined by its object 
constants, function constants, and predicate constants. Terms are built as in the correspond- 
ing first-order language; atoms have the form p(tt , . . . , t,), where the ts are terms and p is 
a predicate symbol of arity II. A rule is an expression of the form 
A0 t Al,. . . , A,,notA,+l,...,notA, (1) 
where Ai s are atoms and not is a logical connective called negation asfailure [33,198]. The 
left-hand side of the rule is called the rule’s head or conclusion; the right-hand side is called 
the rule’s body (or premise). A collection of rules is called a general logic program. (They 
are also referred to as normal logic programs.) General logic programs that do not have not 
are called definiteprograms. Formulas and rules not containing variables are called ground. 
The set of all ground atoms in the language of a program H will be denoted by HB(H) 
(Herbrand base of H) with H omitted whenever possible. For a predicate p, atoms(p) 
will denote the subset of HB(H) formed with predicate p, and for a set of predicates 
A, atoms(A) will denote the subset of HB(H) formed with the predicates in A. Unless 
otherwise stated, we assume that rules with variables (usually denoted by capital letters) 
are used as shorthand for the sets of all their ground instantiations. 
A logic program can be viewed as a specification for building possible theories of the 
world, and the rules can be viewed as constraints these theories should satisfy. Semantics of 
logic programs differ in the way they define satisfiability of the rules. In this paper, we will 
mainly use the stable model semantics [80] and its extensions, but most of our discussion 
will be semantics independent. Under this semantics, the corresponding theories are sets 
of ground atoms, called the stable models of a program. They are defined as follows: 
Definition 2.1. The stable model of a definite program ll is the smallest subset S of HB 
suchthat,foranyruleAotAt ,..., A,fromH,ifAl,..., A,ES,thenAuES. 
The stable model of a definite program ll is denoted by a( l-l). 
Let ll be an arbitrary general logic program. For any set S of atoms, let Hs be a 
program obtained from H by deleting 
(i) each rule that has a formula not A in its body with A E S, and 
(ii) all formulas of the form not A in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
Clearly, lIs does not contain not, so that its stable model is already defined. If this stable 
model coincides with S, then we say that S is a stable model of H. In other words, a stable 
model of H is characterized by the equation 
s = u(lY>. (2) 
0 
A ground atom P is true in S if P E S; otherwise, P is false (i.e., -P is true) in S. 
The definition is extended to arbitrary first-order formulas in the standard way. H entails a 
formula f (ll k f) if f is true in all stable models of H. We will say that the answer to a 
ground query q is yes if q is true in all stable models of H (i.e., H i= q), no if-q is true 
in all stable models of H (i.e., H b -q), and unknown otherwise. 
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Example 2.2.1. Assume that our language contains two object constants a and b and con- 
sider 
II = {p(X) 4- notq(X); 4(a) +] 
Let us show that a set S = {q(a), p(b)] . IS a stable model of II. By construction, lIs = 
{p(b) t; q(a) t} whose stable model is obviously equal to S. Later, we will show that 
there is no other stable model of Il. ’ 0 
It is easy to see that logic programs are nonmonotonic, i.e., adding new information to 
the program may force a reasoner associated with it to withdraw its previous conclusions 
about the world. This happens, for instance, if we expand the program from Example 2.1 
by a new fact q(b) +. It is easy to see that the old program entails p(b), while the new 
one does not. 
The above notion of entailment can also be defined in terms of models of classical logic. 
To do that, every rule in a program Il of the form (1) is replaced by the first-order formula 
The resulting first-order theory will be denoted by Tn. If fl is definite, then Tn is a Horn 
theory and the stable model of Il coincides with the minimal (w.r.t. set-theoretic inclusion) 
Herbrand model of Tn. (By Herbrand model of a first-order theory T, we mean a collection 
of ground atoms that satisfies formulas from T.) It is easy to show that a stable model 
of a general logic program II is a model of its classical counterpart Tn. This explains 
the use of the term “model” in the definition of the stable model semantics which was 
influenced by the “preferred models” [3, 187, 2321 approach to the semantics of logic 
programs. According to this approach, a logic program ll is identified with its classical 
counterpart, and its semantics is given in terms of some (preferred) class of models of Il. 
In many approaches to the semantics of logic programs, they are still (consciously as well 
as often subconsciously) not separated from their classical counterparts. In extensions of 
logic programming discussed in this paper, mapping of programs into classical theories 
becomes more complicated so we prefer to stress the nonclassical character of the logic 
programming connectives from the beginning and to try to avoid the use of the term model 
in the Tarskian sense. 
Uniqueness of a stable model is an important property of the program. Programs which 
have a unique stable model are called categorical. 
The next two examples show that not all programs are categorical. There are programs 
with multiple stable models and with no stable models at all. The latter will be called 
incoherent. Programs with at least one stable model are called coherent. 
Example 2.2.2. Consider the general logic program Il = {p t not p}. We now show that 
it is incoherent. Let us assume that it has a stable model S. Consider two cases: 
(a) if p E S, then Ils is empty and so is its stable model. Since S is not empty, it is not 
a stable model of Il. 
(b) if p @ S, then IIs = (p t}, its stable model is (p}, and hence S is not a stable 
model of Il. The contradiction falsifies our assumption, and therefore Il has no 
stable models. 0 
The program from the next example has two stable models. 
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Exumple 2.2.3. Consider a general logic program 
p tnotq 
q t not p. 
It is easy to check that this program has two stable models [p} and {q}. 0 
Coherence and categoricity are important properties of logic programs. There is a col- 
lection of results giving sufficient conditions for these properties. We will now discuss 
some of these results. We start with the class of stratified programs [3, 232,261. 
Dejinition 2.2. A partition no, . . . , Xk of the set of all predicate symbols of a general logic 
program Il is a strut$cation of Il, if for any rule of the type (1) and for any p E JC,~, 
0 p s 5 k, if A0 E atoms(p), then: 
(a) for every 1 5 i 5 m, there is q and j 5 s such that q E nj and Ai E atoms(q) 
(b) for every m + 1 5 i _( n, there is q and j < s such that q E nj and Ai E atoms(q), 
i.e., no, . . . , nk is a stratification of n if, for all rules in n, the predicates that appear 
only positively in the body of a rule are in strata lower than or equal to the stratum of the 
predicate in the head of the rule, and the predicates that appear under negation as failure 
are in strata lower than the stratum of the predicate in the head of the rule. 
This stratification of the predicates defines a stratification of the rules to strata Iln, . . , 
nk where a strata Iii contains rules whose heads are formed by predicates from rri. lli 
can be viewed as a definition of relations from rri. The above condition allows definitions 
which are mutually recursive, but prohibits the use of negation as failure for the yet 
undefined predicates. 
A program is called strutijied if it has a stratification. cl 
Example 2.2.4. A general logic program Il consisting of rules 
p(f(X)) +- P(XL not 4(X) 
p(u) +- 
q(X) t not r(X) 
r(u) +- 
is stratified with a stratification (r}, (q}, (p}. 0 
Given a program ll, the dependency graph, Dn, of lI consists of the predicate names as 
the vertices, and (Pi, Pj , s) is a labeled edge in Dn iff there is a rule r in Il with Pi in its 
head and Pj in its body and the label s E {+, -} denoting whether Pj appears in a positive 
or a negative literal in the body of r. Note that an edge may be labeled both by + and -. 
A cycle in the dependency graph of a program is said to be a negative cycle if it contains at 
least one edge with a negative label. 
Proposition 2.1 131. A general logic program l7 is stratified iff its dependency graph Dn 
does not contain any negative cycles. q 
The notion of stratification plays an important role in the fields of logic programming, 
deductive databases, and AI. The following theorem describes an important property of 
stratified programs. 
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Proposition 2.2 [3, 801. Any stratified general logic program is categorical. 0 
It is easy to see that the program from Example 2.2.1 is stratified, and therefore has only 
one stable model. 
Existence of stable models was further studied in [62,24,45, 1871. The following result, 
due to Fages [62], is representative of this direction of research. 
A general logic program is said to be cull-consistent [ 121,212] if its dependency graph 
does not have a cycle with an odd number of negative edges. 
Theorem 2.3 [62]. A call-consistent logic program whose dependency graph does not 
have a cycle with only positive edges has at least one stable model. 0 
In our further discussion, we will need the following lemma about general logic programs. 
Lemma 2.4 [161]. For any stable model S of a general logic program n: 
(a) For any ground instance of a rule of the type (1) from lT, if { Al, . . . , A,,,} C S and 
{A,+l,..., A,}f1S=0,thenAo~S. 
(b) If A0 E S, then there exists a ground instance of a rule of the type (1) from l7 such 
that 
{Al ,..., A,)5Sand{A,+l,..., A,}nS=0. 0 
2.2. Representing Knowledge in General Logic Programs 
In this section, we discuss several examples of the use of general logic programs for rep- 
resentation of knowledge and for commonsense reasoning. We will start by demonstrating 
how general logic programs can be used to formalize normative statements, i.e., state- 
ments of the form “As are normally (typically, as a rule, etc.) Bs.” Statements of this form 
are commonly used in various types of commonsense reasoning. The following story is 
due to McCarthy [ 1421. 
Suppose that a reasoning agent has the following knowledge about birds: birds typically 
fly, and penguins are nonflying birds. He also knows that Tweety is a bird. Suppose, now, 
that the agent is hired to build a cage for Tweety, and he leaves off the roof on the grounds 
that he does not know whether or not Tweety can fly. It would be reasonable for us to view 
this argument as invalid and to refuse the agent’s product. This would not be the case if 
Tweety could not fly for some reason (unknown to the agent), and we refused to pay for the 
bird cage because the agent had “unnecessarily” put a roof on it. The following example 
shows how this type of knowledge can be represented by a general logic program. 
Example 2.2.5. Consider a program’B consisting of the rules 
1. flies(X) t bird(X), not ab(r1, X) 
2. bird(X) t penguin(X) 
3. ab(r1, X) t penguin(X) 
I 
a 
4. make-top(X) t flies(X) 
2We will discuss several versions of this program and use B with subscripts to denote the different 
versions. 
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used together with some facts about particular birds, say, 
f 1. bird(tweety) + 
f 2. penguin(sam) +- 
Most predicate names in this example are self-explanatory. r 1 is a constant in our language 
used to name the rule I., and the atom ab(r 1, X) stands for birds whose flying ability 
is suspect (i.e., to which rule 1. is not applicable). The first rule expresses a normative 
statement about the flying ability of birds. (Statements of this sort are often called default 
assumptions, or just defaults.) It allows us to conclude that a bird X flies unless we can 
establish that it is exceptional with respect to flying. Rule 3., which is used to block the 
application of default 1. to penguins, is sometimes called a cancellation rule. 
In general, normative statements of the form “as are normally bs” are represented in the 
language of general logic programs by the rules 
b(X) t a(X), not ab(r, X) (3) 
where r is a constant of our language used to name the rule (3). 
Similarly, the exception to a normative statement of the form “cs are exceptional as. 
They are not bs” is represented by the rule 
ab(r, X) t c(X) (4) 
Exceptions of this sort will be called strong exceptions. (Compare with weak exceptions 
in (13) in Section 3.) The cancellation rule (4) can be viewed as a particular instance of 
a general reasoning principle called the Inheritance Principle [226], according to which 
more speccfic information is preferable to that which is more general. 
It is easy to see that a general logic program B consisting of rules 1.-4. and the facts (fl) 
and (f2) is stratified, and hence, has a unique stable model. Now, let us use Lemma 2.4 to 
find answers to some queries about the flying abilities of various birds. We will start with the 
query flies(tweety). Let S be the stable model of D. By the lemma, fZies(tweety) E S 
iff 
(a) bird(tweety) E S, and 
(b) ab(r 1, tweety) $ S. 
Statement (a) follows immediately from (fl) and the lemma. To prove (b), we need to show 
that penguin(tweety) $ S, which follows immediately from the same lemma. 
Hence, using (a) and (b), together with rule 1. and the first part of the lemma, we have 
flies(tweety) E S, and hence the answer to the query f lies(tweety) is yes. It is equally 
easy to show that the answer to the query f lies(sam) is no. 0 
The above example is a typical example of reasoning with inheritance hierarchies. We 
will use it throughout the paper. There is a vast literature on representing inheritance hierar- 
chies using nonmonotonic formalisms (For a survey, see [loll.) Representing inheritance 
hierarchies using logic programs is discussed in [89, 130, 170, 1731. 
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the application of general logic 
programs to the formalization of reasoning about results of actions. Let us start with 
a form of such reasoning called temporal projection, in which we are given a complete 
description of the initial state of the world and a complete description of the effects of 
actions, and we are asked to determine what the world will look like after a series of actions 
is performed. The most frequently cited example of such reasoning is probably the Yale 
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Shooting Problem (YSP) from [ 1001. The original formalization of the problem uses the 
language of situation calculus [ 15 11. (An alternative approach can be found in [ 1171.) The 
syntax of the language contains variables of three sorts: situation variables S, S’, . , .;Jluent 
variables F, F’, . . .; 3and action variables A, A’, . . .4 Its only situation constant is SO, and 
r-es (A, S) denotes the new situation that is reached after the action A is executed in situation 
S. The atom ho&( F, S) means that the fluent F is true in situation S. There are also some 
other predicate and function symbols. The sorts of their arguments and values will be clear 
from their use in the rules below. 
Example 2.2.6. In the Yale Shooting Problem (YSP), there are two fluents: alive and loaded, 
and three actions: wait, load, and shoot. We know that the execution of loading leads to the 
gun being loaded, and that if the gun is shot while it is loaded, a turkey (named Fred) dies. 
We want to predict that after the execution of actions load, wait, and shoot (in that order), 
Fred will be dead. It seems that the commonsense argument which leads to this conclusion 
is based on the so-called axiom of inertia which says, “Things normally tend to stay the 
same” [151]. This is a typical normative statement, which in accordance with (3), can be 
represented by the rule 
yt: holds(F, res(A, S)) t holds(F, S), not ab(yl, A, F, S) 
To represent the effect of the actions load, shoot, and wait, we need only the rule 
~2: holds(loaded, res(load, S)) +- 
and the cancellation rule 
y3: ab(yt, shoot, alive, S) t holds(loaded, S) 
which represent the priority of specific knowledge about the results of actions over the 
general law of inertia. Let se be the initial state, and suppose we are given that 
y4: holds(aliue, so). 
Even though the resulting program JJ consisting of yt-y4 is not stratified, it is possible to 
show (see Theorem 2.5) that it has a unique stable model. From this and Lemma 2.4, it is 
easy to see that y entails 
holds(aliue, res(load, SO)), and 
-holds(aliue, res(shoot, res(wait, (res(load, so))))). 0 
As we can see, the logic programming solution [61, 2, 561 to the original Yale Shooting 
Problem is rather natural and simple. (This is not, of course, to say that it can be easily 
generalized to more complicated forms of reasoning about actions.) It is worth recalling 
that the original formulations of this story in the formalisms of circumscription and normal 
defaults led to unacceptable results. Some of the later solutions, in particular those from 
[75] and [ 1581, were given in the language of autoepistemic logic and nonnormal default 
theory, respectively, and are similar to the one presented here. 
3AJIuent is something that may depend on the situation, as, for instance, the location of a movable object. 
We will use propositional fluents which are assertions that can be true andfalse, depending on the situation. 
4Using a sorted language implies, first of all, that all atoms in the rules of the program are formed in 
accordance with the syntax of sorted predicate logic. Moreover, when we speak of an instance of a rule, it 
always will be assumed that the terms substituted for variables are of the appropriate sorts. 
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 83 
Representing inheritance reasoning and reasoning about actions in logic programming is 
an active area of research [83, 12,47, 186,60,41, 1171. Some of the works on both subjects 
will be discussed in the upcoming sections. We especially want to mention important 
challenges: formulation of more general forms of inheritance, development of theories of 
actions with rich ontologies, and finding efficient computational means of detecting loops 
and dealing with floundering queries. 
The existence of a unique stable model and some additional insights into the above 
solution can be obtained from the fact that it belongs to the class of acyclic programs 
studied in [2]. We will briefly describe this class and its properties. 
Intuitively, the atom dependency graph of a program II is analogous to the dependency 
graph, but has as its vertices ground atoms, instead of predicate names. 
Consider a program II, whose rules with variables have been replaced by the sets of all 
their possible ground instantiations. The atom dependency graph, ADn, of Il consists of 
the ground atoms as the vertices. A triple (Pi, Pi, s) is a labeled edge in ADn iff there is a 
rule r in ll with Pi in its head and Pj in its body and the label s E (+, -} denoting whether 
Pj appears in a positive or a negative literal in the body of r. 
A general logic program is said to be acyclic if its atom dependency graph does not have 
a cycle. 
For example, the dependency graph of a program, II = {p(u) t p(b)} does contain 
a cycle with only positive edges, but the atom dependency graph of II does not. It is also 
easy to see that program y is acyclic. 
As was shown in [2], most of the semantics of general logic programs coincide for this 
class. 
The following theorem is obtained by combining results from [2, 241 and [ 1891 and is 
further discussed in Section 2.4. 
Theorem 2.5 (21. Let II be an acyclic program. Then we have: 
(i) l7 has a unique recursive5stable model; 
(ii) For every ground atom A, Il b A ifScomp( fI) U DCA + A, where comp( II) stands 
for the Clark’s completion of lI and DCA is the domain closure axiom [ 1991; 
(iii) For all groundatoms A that do notJEounde@ lI k A #there is an SLDNFderivation 
[33] of Afrom lI. 13 
The first condition of the theorem guarantees that, for a rather broad class of programs 
(including y), there is an algorithm to answer all ground queries. (This is, of course, 
not true in the general case, even for definite programs. As was shown in [4], there are 
definite programs with nonrecursive sets of ground consequences.) The second one states 
that entailment in such programs II is equivalent to classical entailment in the first-order 
theory comp(II) U DCA. (More information on the form of this theory can be found in 
Section 2.4.) Finally, the last condition establishes the fact that a particular, rather efficient, 
decision procedure, called SLDNF resolution, always terminates on nonfloundering ground 
queries of Y. This is especially important because SLDNF is incorporated in most existing 
Prolog interpreters. 
‘A set is recursive if its characteristic function is recursive. 
btuitively, we say A flounders with respect to ll if, while proving A from l7 using SLDNF-derivation, 
a goal is reached which contains only nonground negative literals. For a precise definition, see [131]. 
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2.3. Answering Queries 
Several query-answering methods have been suggested for stratified programs in the liter- 
ature: in particular, SLDNF resolution [33] and XOLDT resolution [228, 2381. SLDNF 
resolution, although sound 1331, is only complete for a subclass of stratified programs [ 1081. 
Various practical Prolog systems have been developed based on SLDNF resolution. 
To answer queries with respect to programs with a multiple number of stable models, 
several approaches have been suggested [171, 19, 70, 225, 103, 240, 561 in the literature. 
Warren’s XOLDT resolution uses a combination of bottom-up and top-down methods. Bell 
et al. [I91 present an approach to compute the stable models by constructing a linear 
programming problem from the program and solving the linear programming problem. In 
[59, 1761, truth maintenance systems are used to compute the stable models of a general 
program. Fernandez and Lobo [69] propose an almost top-down proof procedure to find 
answers to queries with respect o the stable model semantics. A “fully top-down” procedure 
is impossible even in the propositional case since, for some programs, the truth of a literal 
w.r.t. stable model semantics cannot be decided looking only at the atom dependency graph 
below it. (See, for instance, Example 2.2.11.) As mentioned above, no complete procedure 
(top-down or otherwise) is possible in the general case. Fernandez et al. [70] and Inoue et 
al. [ 1031 propose bottom-up methods to compute all the stable models of a general program. 
While Fernandez et al. [70] transform a general logic program to a disjunctive logic program 
with constraints, Inoue et al. [ 1031 transform a general program to a propositional theory. 
They show that the minimal (in the sense of set-theoretic inclusion) models of the resultant 
theory that satisfy certain conditions are the stable models of the original program. 
To give the reader a flavor of the issues involved, we now present the approach of [ 1031 
in more detail. Their approach is based on transforming a general logic program into a 
propositional theory in an extended language, and reducing computing stable models of 
the original program to computing minimal models of the transformed theory that satisfy 
certain properties. 
In the transformation, we use new atoms that are constructed from the atoms of the 
original program. For each atom A, we add the new atoms A- and A+ to the language of 
the transformation. Intuitively, A+ means A is believed to be true and A- means A is not 
believed to be true. 
The transformation of II, trl(lI), is obtained by translating each ground rule of the 
general logic program of the form (1) 
A0 +-Al,..., A,,,, notA,+l, . . . , notA, 
to the propositional formula 
A1 A.. . A A, > (A,,, A.. . A A, A Ao) v A,++, v.. . v A,f 
Let Il be a general logic program and M(trl (II)) denote the minimal models of trl (lT) 
which satisfy the following (qualifying) properties: 
(a) If a model contains A-, then it can contain neither A, nor A+ 
(b) If a model contains A+, it must also contain A. 
Let stable(n) = {S: S’ E M(trl(n)) and S is obtained from S’ by removing all atoms 
with + and - in their superscript}. 
Theorem 2.6 11031. Foranygeneral logicprogram lI, stable(n) is thesetofstable models 
Ofl-l. cl 
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Example 2.2.7. Consider the general logic program Ill 
p t notq 
q tnotp 
trl (l-I 1) consists of the rules 
(q-AP)vq+ 
(P-Aq)vP+ 
and has the four minimal models: 
K, P, P-, q], tq-, P, P+], {s+, P-, q] and Is+, P+]. 
The first one contains p and p-, and hence is disqualified. The fourth contains p+ and q+, 
but contains neither p nor q, and hence is also disqualified. The second and the third satisfy 
all the qualifying properties. Hence, stable(II 1) consists of two stable models which are 
obtained from the second and the third one, and which are (p) and {q}. 13 
There are several approaches to compute the minimal models of a positive disjunctive 
program [65, 711. Fernandez et al. [70] use model trees to compute minimal models. 
Inoue et al. [ 1031 use an extension of the model generation theorem prover (MGTP) [65] 
to directly compute the minimal models of the formulas obtained using o-1. Obviously, 
much more work is needed to find efficient methods of answering queries and computing 
the stable models of general logic programs. 
2.4. Other Semantics of General Logic Programs 
In this section, we briefly describe some of the other approaches to the semantics of general 
logic programs. For a more detailed discussion, see the paper by Apt and Bol in this issue.7 
The research on finding a declarative semantics for general logic programs started with 
the pioneering work of Clark [33] and Reiter [198]. Clark [33] introduced the concept of 
program completion to define a declarative semantics for negation as failure. In a general 
logic program, the bodies of clauses with a predicate p in the head can be viewed as 
“sufficiency” conditions for inferring p from the program. Clark suggested that the bodies 
of the clauses can also be taken as “necessary” conditions, with the result that negative 
information about p can be assumed if all these conditions are not met. More precisely, 
Clark’s completion of a general logic program II, denoted by Comp(II), is obtained through 
the following steps: 
Step 1: All rules in Il of the type (1) where Ao is p(tl, . . . , tk), are converted to clauses 
of the type 
3Y1 . .3Y,((Xl = tl) A.. . A (Xk = tk) A A1 A.. . A A,A 
-A m+l A . . . A -A,) 3 P(~I, . . . > &c) 
(5) 
where X1 . . . Xk are variables not appearing in the original rule, and Yt , . . . , Ys are 
variables appearing in the original rule. 
7Since the paper of Apt and Bol in this issue is on semantics of logic programs and discusses the various 
semantics in detail, our treatment of semantics other than the stable model semantics is brief. 
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Step 2: For each predicate p, if 
El 3 P(XI,...,&) 
E, I p(Xl,. . ., &> 
are all the clauses with p in its head that are generated in Step 1 (with each Ei of the 
form3Yt . . . %‘,((xl = tl) A.. . A (xl = tk) A A1 A.. . A A, A lA,+l A.. . A -An), 
then Comp(ll) contains the first-order formula 
t/Xl. . .V&(P(Xl, . . ., X/J f, El v . . . v E,) 
Step 3: For each predicate 4, if there is no rule with q in its head in the program II, then 
Camp(n) contains the first-order formula 
vxt . . .vxk-q(xI,. . . , Xk) 
Comp(l7), Clark’s completion of a general logic program II, contains the first-order 
formulas generated in Steps 2 and 3 above and the corresponding equality theory [33]. 
The first-order formulasobtained in Steps 2 and 3 above allow us to infer negative facts. 
Clark’s completion [33] was the first declarative semantics of a general logic program. 
It partially corresponded to the procedural NAF rule and the SLDNF-resolution. Clark [33] 
provided a constructive definition for completing a general logic program and used it to prove 
the soundness of the NAF rule and the SLDNF-resolution. Moreover, for a large class of 
programs (see, for instance, Theorem 2.5), the completion is computable, equivalent to the 
stable model semantics and sound and complete with respect to the SLDNF-resolution. 
The existence of Clark’s declarative semantics facilitated the development of a theory of 
logic programs. It made possible first proofs of correctness of certain transformations of 
logic programs such as fold/unfold [227], proofs of equivalence, and other properties of 
programs. It is still widely and successfully used for logic programming applications. 
Unfortunately, Clark’s semantics appears too weak for the representation of some type 
of knowledge. Consider the following example due to Van Gelder: 
Example 2.2.8. Suppose that we are given a graph, say, 
edge(a, b) t 
edge(c, d) t 
edge(d, c) t 
and want to describe which vertices of the graph are reachable from a given vertex a. The 
following program seems to be a natural candidate for such a description: 
reachable(a) +- 
reachabEe(X) + edge(Y, X), reachable(Y) 
We clearly expect vertices c and d not to be reachable. However, Clark’s completion of the 
predicate “reachable” gives only 
reachable(X) 3 (X = a v gY(reachabZe(Y) A edge(Y, X))) 
from which such a conclusion cannot be derived. The difficulty was recognized as serious 
(for a good discussion of the subject, see, for instance, [190]) and prompted the attempts of 
finding other approaches to defining the semantics of logic programs. 0 
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From this point, the quest for an appropriate semantics for general logic programs pro- 
ceeded in several directions, which can be classified broadly and incompletely into three 
different approaches. 
TheJirst approach was to put a syntactic restriction on the program. Chandra and Hare1 
[26] defined the concept of stratification, and Apt et al. [3] and Van Gelder [232] developed 
a fixpoint semantics for stratified programs. Przymusinski [ 1881 generalized the concept 
of stratification and introduced local stratification and perfect models. The concept of local 
stratification was further extended by Przymusinska and Przymusinski [ 1821 when they 
introduced the concept of weak stratification. 
The second approach [63, 66, 67, 120, 121, 132, 165, 2341 was to use three-valued 
logic instead of the classical two-valued logic. Fitting [63, 66, 671, Kunen [120, 1211, and 
others [ 132, 1651 used Kleene’s strong three-valued logic, while Van Gelder et al. [234] 
used a different three-valued logic to give the well-founded semantics of a logic program. 
Przymusinski [189, 1921, Dung [46], Van Gelder [233], and many others gave alternative 
formalizations of the well-founded semantics. 
The semantics of Fitting and Jacob differ from the well-founded semantics. For the 
program consisting of the rule p t p, Fitting and Jacob assign the truth value unknown to 
p, while the well-founded semantics (also the perfect model semantics) assigns the value 
false to p. The well-founded semantics is an extension of the perfect model semantics, 
unlike Fitting and Jacob’s semantics. 
The third approach is analogous to the traditional approach in Reiter’s default logic [200] 
and Moore’s autoepistemic logic [ 1571 in which the definition of entailment is based on 
the notion of beliefs. The stable model semantics [80] used in this paper is based on this 
approach. In [23], Baral and Subrahamanian introduce the concept of stable classes as a 
generalization of the stable models. 
Some of these approaches aimed at preserving reduction of the notion of entailment in 
logic programming to entailment in “classical” two-valued or three-valued theories. Others 
moved closer to nontraditional nonmonotonic logics. 
To give the reader a flavor of these developments, we introduce the well-founded seman- 
tics, and compare it with the stable models semantics. We will follow the ideas from [22] 
and [233]. 
Dejinition 2.3 1221. For any general logic program II and a set of atoms S, consider 
Fn (S) = u(lIs), where a and lIs are as in Definition 2.1 of stable models. C, a set of 
interpretutions,8is said to be a stable cluss of Il iff C = { Fn(S): S E C}. A stable class 
is said to be a strict stable class if no proper subset of it is a stable class. 0 
For any general logic program fI, stable models are the fixpoints of the operator Fn. For 
some programs, this function may not have fixpoints. The intuition behind a stable class is 
that, even though Fn may have no fixpoints (i.e., Fn does not cycle around a single point), 
there might be a collection of interpretations o that Fn cycles around them. 
Example 2.2.9. Consider the following general logic program IIs: 
a tnotu 
P+- 
‘An interpretation is a set of ground atoms. 
88 C. EARAL AND M. GELFOND 
This program does not have any stable models. But II3 has two stable classes: So, which 
is the empty collection of interpretations, and Sr = {II, Z2) where 
11 = (P} 
12 = Ia, PI 
Thus, Il3 has a unique nonempty stable class, viz. S1, and p is true in all interpretations 
contained in S1. 0 
Lemma 2.7 (22, 681. Let lfp standfor leastjxpointand gfp standforgreatestfixpomt. For 
anyprogram n, Ufp(F$), gfp(FA)I is a stable class, where Fh denotes the operator 
that applies Fn twice. 0 
We now give a simple characterization of the well-founded semantics in terms of stable 
classes. 
Definition 2.4 [22]. For a genera1 logic program Il, the stable class {Zfp(FA), 
gfp(FA)} defines the well-founded semantics of Il, i.e., 
1. a ground atom A is true in the well-founded semantics of II iff A E Ifp(Fi), and 
2. a ground atom A isfalse in the well-founded semantics of Il iff A @ gfp(Fi), 
3. a ground atom A is unde$ned in the well-founded semantics of Il if neither of the 
above two cases holds. 0 
It was shown in [234] that, unlike the stable mode1 semantics, the well-founded semantics 
is defined for all genera1 logic programs. Even though the stable model semantics is not 
defined for fI3 of Example 2.9, the well-founded semantics is defined and its answer to p 
and a is true and unknown, respectively. 
In the following examples, we show programs for which both semantics are defined, but 
give different answers to queries. 
Example 2.2.10. Consider the following program fI4: 
p t nota 
p tnotb 
a tnotb 
b t nota I 
fl4 
The above program has two stable models {p, a} and {p, b}. It has three stable classes, 
{(p, a)), {(p, b}), and {(}, {p, a, b}]. The stable class {(}, (p, a, b}] corresponds to the 
well-founded semantics of the above program. Therefore, p is a consequence of II4 in the 
stable mode1 semantics, while the answer to p in the well-founded semantics is undefined. 
0 
Example 2.2.11. Consider the following program lT5 [232]: 
q tnotr 
r tnotq 





Fl5 has a unique stable model, viz. {p, q}. Tl5 has three strict stable classes (stable 
classes which have no proper subset which is also a stable class), namely, Cl, C2, and C3, 
where Cl = {{q, p}}, C2 = (0, {p, q, I}), and C3 = {{r}, {r, p}). Of these, the class C2 
corresponds to the well-founded semantics which says that p, q, r are all undejked. Notice 
that even though p is the consequence of Hs in the stable model semantics, its addition to 
Fls alters the set of consequences of H=J. In particular, we will no longer be able to conclude 
4. 0 
Well-founded semantics can be considered an approximation of stable models in the 
sense that the well-founded semantics is correct with respect to stable model semantics 
[ 1931. By “correct,” we mean that if a program has stable models, then if an atom is true 
(resp. false) with respect to the well-founded semantics, then it is true (resp. false) with 
respect to the stable model semantics. 
For the broad class of weakly stratified programs [184], the well-founded semantics 
coincides with the stable model semantics. 
There are several attempts to classify the various semantics of general logic programs. 
One attempt uses the notion of complexity of query answering.‘Another attempt is based 
on establishing basic principles of nonmonotonic entailment. This approach was first sug- 
gested in [73] and further developed by Makinson, Lehmann [ 1221, and others. For a good 
application of this approach in the context of logic programming, see [39, 401. Let us 
illustrate the main idea by introducing one such property, called cautious monotonicity, 
according to which an entailment relation (k) defined by a logic programming semantics 
should satisfy the condition 
nl=a,nt== 
l-lU{at}+b 
As mentioned in Example 2.2.11, entailment based on stable model semantics does not 
satisfy this property, while the well-founded semantics does [39]. This fact can be and 
often is viewed as an argument against stable model semantics. It can also be viewed as 
the beginning of a search for broad classes of programs for which cautious monotonicity 
holds. This is, of course, true for weakly stratified programs. 
The above discussion shows that, despite substantial progress, the nature of the negation 
as failure operator not is still not fully understood. Our belief is that the best way to 
improve the situation is to try to apply these semantics and their extensions to knowledge 
representation problems and to compare the elegance and efficiency of the corresponding 
representations. For a more comprehensive discussion on semantics of logic programs, see 
Apt and Bol’s paper in this volume. 
3. EXTENDED LOGIC PROGRAMS 
Categorical general logic programs discussed in the previous section provide a powerful 
tool for knowledge representation in situations which warrant the use of the closed world 
assumption.lOHowever, since every ground query to such programs is answered yes or 
no, they do not allow a programmer directly to represent incomplete knowledge about 
‘For example, in the propositional case, the well-founded semantics is computationally more efficient 
than the stable model semantics. See Section 10 for more discussion on complexity issues. 
‘“Informally closed world assumption or CWA [ 1981 about a statement p means that p is assumedfalse 
unless there is some evidence to the contrary. 
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the world. To do that, the language should allow for a third possibility-the unknown 
answer, which corresponds to the inability to conclude yes or no. In this section, we discuss 
“extended” logic programs (ELP’s) [82] (see also [236,175,196]) that contain a second type 
of negation 1 (called “classical,” “ strong,” or “explicit” by different authors who associate 
different meanings to it)’ t in addition to negation-as-failure not. General logic programs 
provide negative information implicitly, through closed-world reasoning; an extended logic 
program can include explicit negative information. In the language of extended programs, 
we can distinguish between a query which fails in the sense that it does not succeed and a 
query which fails in the stronger sense that its negation succeeds. 
Formally, by an extended logic program, II, we mean a collection of rules of the form 
LotLl,..., L,,notL,+l,..., notL, (7) 
where the Ls are literals, i.e., formulas of the form p or -p, where p is an atom. 
The set of all literals in the language of Il will be denoted by Lit. By Lit(p), we denote 
the collection of ground literals formed by the predicate p. The semantics of an extended 
logic program assigns to it a collection of its answer sets-sets of literals corresponding to 
beliefs which can be built by a rational reasoner on the basis of Il. We well say that literal 
-p is true in an answer set S if-p E S. Recall that not p is true in S if p @ S. We will 
say that Ii’s answer to a literal query q is yes if q is true in all answer sets of Il, no if qt2is 
true in all answer sets of Il, and unknown otherwise. 
To give a definition of answer sets of extended logic programs, let us first consider 
programs without negation as failure. 
The answer set of Il not containing not is the smallest (in the sense of set-theoretic 
inclusion) subset S of Lit such that 
(i) foranyruleLutLt ,..., L,fromlI,ifLt ,..., L,ES,thenLoES; 
(ii) if S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S = Lit. 
Obviously, every program Il that does not contain negation as failure has a unique answer 
set which will be denoted by @II). 
Definition 3.1. Let II be an extended logic program without variables. For any set S of 
literals, let lIs be the logic program obtained from Il by deleting 
(i) each rule that has a formula not L in its body with L E S, and 
(ii) all formulas of the form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules. 
0 
Clearly, lIs does not contain not, so that its answer set is already defined. If this answer 
set coincides with S, then we say that S is an answer set of II. In other words, the answer 
sets of Il are characterized by the equation 
S = b(l?). 
“In this paper, we refer to it as “classical” negation. As was shown by Pearce and Wagner, this negation 
has close ties with the constructive negation of Nelson [167]. 
‘*For any literal 1, the symbol I denotes the literal opposite in sign to 1, i.e., for an atom a, if I = -u, 
thenj=a,andifI=u,thenr=-u. 
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Consider, for instance, the extended program Ill consisting of just one rule: 
-q t notp. 
Intuitively, this rule means: “q is false if there is no evidence that p is true.” The only 
answer set of this program is {-q}. The answers that the program should give to the queries 
p and q are, respectively, unknown and false. 
As another example, compare two programs that do not contain not: 
and 
-p +, 4 + ‘P. 
Let us call them II2 and Il3, respectively. Each of the programs has a single answer set, 
but these sets are different. The answer set of II2 is (-p}; the answer set of,lI3 is {-p, q}. 
Thus, our semantics is not “contrapositive” with respect to t and -; it assigns different 
meanings to the rules p t -q and q t -p. The reason is that it interprets expressions 
like these as inference rules, rather than conditionals. (For positive programs, both points 
of view lead to the same semantics.) We can view this as an indication that the language 
of extended programs includes classical negation, but not classical implication. (From an 
alternative standpoint, t can be viewed as a three-valued or a constructive implication and 
- as some form of explicit negation.) 
This approach has important computational advantages. Under rather general conditions, 
evaluating a query for an extended program can be reduced to evaluating two queries for a 
program that does not contain classical negation. Our extension of general logic programs 
hardly brings any new computational difficulties. 
Dejinition 3.2. An extended logic program is said to be inconsistent if it has an inconsistent 
answer set. 0 
Proposition 3.1. An extended logic program Il is inconsistent iff Il has the unique answer 
set Lit. 
Syntactically, the class of general logic programs is a subclass of the class of extended 
logic programs. For any general logic program, its stable models coincide with its answer 
sets. Notice, however, that whenever a program not containing 1 answers no to a query 
q under the stable model semantics, the answer to the same query under the answer set 
semantics will be unknown. 
Since general logic programs are also extended logic programs, Example 2.2.1 is also 
an example of an extended logic program with no answer sets. Similarly, Example 2.2 is 
an example of an extended logic program with multiple answer sets. 
Let us now show that extended logic programs can be reduced to general logic programs. 
We will need the following notation: 
For any predicate p occurring in II, let p’ be a new predicate of the same arity. The atom 
P’(Xl> . . . , X,) will be called the positive form of the negative literal -p(Xl, . . . , X,). 
Every positive literal is, by definition, its own positive form. The positive form of a literal 
L will be denoted by L+. l7+ stands for th e general logic program obtained from Il by 
replacing each rule (7) by 
Lof +- Lt, . . . . Lz,not L,f,,, . . . . not L,+ 
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For any set S c Lit, S+ stands for the set of the positive forms of the elements of S. 
Proposition 3.2 [al]. A consistent set S c Lit is an answer set of Il if and only if S+ is 
a stable model of II+. 0 
Proposition 3.2 suggests the following simple way of evaluating queries in extended 
logic programs. To obtain an answer for query p, run queries p and p’ on the program II+. 
If lI+‘s answer to p is yes, then ll’s answer to p is yes. If lI+‘s answer to p’ is yes, then 
II’s answer to p is no. 
The next proposition is an immediate consequence of Propositions 3.2 and 2.1. 
Proposition 3.3 [81]. An extended logic program Il is categorical if 
(a) II+ is stratified, and 
(b) The answer set of II+ does not contain atoms of the form p(t), p’(t). 0 
3.1. Representing Knowledge Using Extended Logic Programs 
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of extended logic programs for formal- 
ization of reasoning with incomplete information. More examples and discussions on the 
subject can be found in [82, 171, 118, 1701. 
Example 3.3.1. Let us go back to the bird’s story from Example 2.2.5, in which we knew 
that birds typically fly, that penguins are exceptions to this rule-they are nonflying birds- 
and that our information about penguins, birds, and flying objects is complete. Let us first 
see how this information can be expressed in the language of extended logic programs. 
Notice that B from Example 2.2.5, viewed as an extended logic program, fails to answer no 
to queries penguin(tweety) andJlies(sam), and therefore is not adequate for our goal. This 
is, of course, not surprising since the closed world assumption, which is responsible for the 
correctness of answers given by 13 under the stable model semantics, is no longer present 
in B under the answer set semantics. To represent the information correctly, we need to 
express the closed world assumption in the language of extended logic programs. This can 
easily be done by adding to 23 the following rules: 
cl. -bird(X) t not bird(X) 
c2. -penguin(X) +- not penguin(X) 
c3. -flies(X) t not flies(X) 
Notice that the program assumes that birds are the only flying objects in the universe. The 
resulting extended logic program 231 is equivalent to the original general logic program a. 
0 
It is possible to show that this is always the case. More precisely, we define the closed 
world interpretation C W (ll) of a general program II to be the extended program obtained 
from ll by adding the rules 
-p(Xt , . . . , X,> + not p(X1, . . . , X,1 (9) 
for all predicate constants p from the language of II, where X1, . . _ , X, are distinct vari- 
ables, and n is the arity of p. The following proposition shows that the answer sets of 
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 93 
C W (l-I) are indeed related to the answer sets of fl, as we expect. Recall that H B stand for 
the set of all positive ground literals in the language of Il. 
Proposition 3.4. If S is an answer set of a general logic program Il, then 
S U (-A: A E HB\S} (10) 
is an answer set of C W (ll). Moreover, every answer set of C W (ll) can be represented 
in the form (lo), where S is an answer set of Il. 0 
Example 3.3.2. Let us now assume that the specification from Example 2.2.5 is expanded 
by a complete list of wounded birds and the following knowledge about their flying ability: 
wounded birds may or may not fly. Our task is to incorporate this information into the 
program. 
Obviously, the full closed world assumption for flying birds is not applicable in this 
situation and should be removed from the specification. We still assume that nonbirds and 
penguins do not fly, which can be expressed by two rules: 
nl. -flies(X) t penguin(X) 
n2. -flies(X) t -bird(X) 
Notice that the rule n2 reads as: if X is not a bird, then X does not fly, which corresponds 
to our specification. This is different from the rule 
-flies(X) t not bird(X) 
which has an epistemic character, and says that if X is not believed to be a bird, then X 
does not fly. 
The next two rules encode our general knowledge about wounded birds. The rule i2 
cancels the application of the default 1 (see program B2 below) to wounded birds and, as 
the corresponding rule 3 for penguins, can be viewed as a formalization of the inheritance 
principle. 
~2. bird(X) t wounded-bird(X) 
i2. ab(r 1, X) t wounded-bird(X) 
Finally, the rule c4 expresses the closed world assumption for wounded birds 
c4. -wounded-bird(X) + not wounded-bird(X) 
Let us use these rules together with some facts about particular birds, say, 
f 1. bird(tweety) t 
f2. penguin(sam) t 
f3. woundedbird(john) t 
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Now, we well show that the program & 
1. flies(X) t bird(X), nor ab(r1, X) 
2. bird(X) t penguin(X) 
3. ab(r 1, X) + penguin(X) 
Cl. -bird(X) + not bird(X) 
c2. lpenguin(X) + not penguin(X) 
c4. -wounded-bird(X) +- not wounded-bird(X) 
nl. -flies(X) t penguin(X) 
n2. -flies(X) t -bird(X) 
s2. bird(X) t woundedbird 
i2. ab(r 1, X) + wounded-bird(X) 
f 1. bird(tweety) t 
f2. penguin(sam) t 
f 3. wounded-bird( john) t I 
has a unique consistent answer set. First, let us notice that the general logic program $ is 
stratified with a stratification 
PO = {bird, penguin, wounded-bird} 
PI = (bird’, penguin’, wounded-bird’} 
9 = (ab} 
p3 = {fEY',"fEYl 
Using Lemma 2.4, it is easy to show that there is no ground literal L such that the answer 
set S contains L and L+. By virtue of Proposition 3.3, this implies that & has a unique 
consistent answer set. Using this fact and Lemma 2.4, it is easy to show that &‘s answer 
to the query f Zies(tweety) is yes, and that the queries f Zies(sam) and f Zies(john) are 
answered no and unknown, respectively. 0 
Example 3.3.3. Let us now modify the specification from Example 3.3.2 one more time by 
removing the closed world assumptions for all predicates from our language. Let us also 
assume that Tweety, Opus, and Sam are birds; Sam is a penguin; Tweety is not; and that 
we do not know about Opus. Notice that since Opus may be a penguin, we do not want to 
conclude that it flies. How can we represent his information? 
The first natural idea seems to use f?$ obtained by removing the closed world assumptions 
(i.e., removing c 1, c2, and c4) from 02. Unfortunately, this does not work. Indeed, consider 
the query f Zies(opus). Since f3; cannot prove that Opus is a penguin or a wounded bird, 
it is forced to conclude that Opus flies, which contradicts our specification. 
This is again not surprising since the corresponding cancellation axioms were written 
under the closed world assumptions and are too weak for an open world case. The more 
general forms of these axioms are 
ab(r 1, X) t not -woundedbird 
ab(r 1, X) t not -penguin(X) 
These axioms stop application of rule 1 for any X which may be a nonflying bird according 
to our specification. Two other necessary additions: 
-penguin(X) +-- -bird(X) 
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and 
-wounded-bird(X) + -bird(X) 
are needed to account for the contrapositive character of implication. 
The resulting program I33 
1. flies(X) t bird(X), notab(r1, X) 
2. bird(X) + penguin(X) 
nl. -flies(X) t penguin(X) 
n2. -flies(X) t -bird(X) 
~2. bird(X) t wounded-bird(X) 
fl. bird(tweety) +- 
f 2. penguin(sam) t 
f 3. wounded_bird( john) + 
ab(r1, X) t not -wounded-bird(X) 
ab(r 1, X) t not -penguin(X) 
-penguin(X) t -bird(X) 
-wounded-bird(X) t -bird(X) 
is more cautious than f?;. It agrees with Bi on queries about Tweety and Sam, but all inquires 
about properties of Opus (except his being a bird) are (correctly) answered as unknown. 
The resulting program works properly if it is used in conjunction with facts formed from 
predicates bird, penguin, and wounded-bird. It is also possible to show that for any query 
1, if f33 b 1, then B2 b 1, i.e., B3 is correct w.r.t. &. 
If, however, we allow facts of the form -flies(X), B3 may become inconsistent. In this 
case, inconsistency may be avoided by replacing the rule 1 by a weaker rule: 
flies(X) + bird(X), notab(r1, X), not -flies(X). (11) 
Let us denote the resulting program by B4. It is possible to show that for any set of facts not 
containing facts of the form -flies(t), where f is an arbitrary ground term, programs I33 
and B4 are equivalent. For a general theorem to this effect, see [92]. This observation leads 
us to a translation of normative statements to extended logic programs which is different 
from the one suggested in Section 2. Namely, a normative statement of the form “As are 
normally Bs” is represented by the rule 
r: b(X) + a(X), not ab(r, X), not -b(X) (12) 
Intuitively, the condition not ab(r, X) in the body of (12) is used to eliminate exception 
to the ruler, while the condition not -b(X) in the body of (12) is used to eliminate possible 
inconsistency because of exception to the conclusion of the rule. This more complex rule 
should be used only if updates of the form -b(c) are allowed by our specification. 
The weak exception to the above normative statement implying that the above default is 
not applicable to cs is represented by the rule 
ub(r, X) t not -c(X) (13) 
and the strong exception to the above normative statement implying that Ds are not Bs is 
represented by the rule 
-b(X) + d(X) (14) 
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Note that the weak exceptions (wounded birds) differ from the strong exceptions (pen- 
guins). For penguins, we would like to conclude that they do not fly, while for wounded 
birds, we do not want to conclude either that they fly, or that they do not fly. Also, we no 
longer need rules of the kind ab(r, X) t not -d(X). This is taken care of by the rule (12). 
It should be noted that not is used only in particular cases: for representing normative 
statements and weak exceptions, for representing the CWA, and for representing “unknown” 
information. For all other cases, the classical 1 is used. This is illustrated in the program 
Z35 below. 
Finally, let us see how we can use this program to model the behavior of the carpenter from 
Example 2.5. Since we are more conscious of our conclusions about the flying abilities of 
birds, rule 4 (from Example 2.2.5) becomes insufficient. It can be replaced by the following 
informal rule guarding the carpenter’s actions: “Do not make a top of the cage for birds 
known to be nonflying, but make it otherwise.” 
The following two rules formalize this in the language of extended logic programs: 
-make_top(X) + -flies(X) 
make-top(X) t not -flies(X) 
The complete program Z?s, as given below, 
-make-top(X) t -flies(X) 
make-top(X) +- not -flies(X) 
flies(X) + bird(X), not ab(r 1, X), not -flies(X) 
2. bird(X) + penguin(X) 
nl. -flies(X) t penguin(X) 
n2. -flies(X) t -bird(X) 
~2. bird(X) t wounded-bird(X) 
f 1. bird(tweety) t 
f 2. penguin(sum) t 
f 3. wounded_bird(john) + 
ub(r 1, X) t not -wounded-bird(X) 
-penguin(X) t -bird(X) 
-wounded-bird(X) t -bird(X) 
provides an alternative model of the reasoning used by the judge to justify his decision. 
Because of its “cautious” approach, the authors prefer it to the formalization in Example 
2.5. [ 131 describes the precise relation between Z35 and Band elaborates why ,135 ispreferable 
to Z3. 
Let us now prove that the above program, taken in conjunction with consistent (pos- 
itive and negative) facts formed by predicates bird, penguin, wounded-bird, andJlies, is 
categorical. 
It is easy to see that Z3; is stratified with a stratification 
PO = {bird, penguin, wounded-bird}, 
PI = WI, 
P2 = {flies’), 
P3 = {flies), and 
p4 = {make-top, make-top’). 
Now, let us show that there is no constant c, such that the answer set S of Z3: contains 
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flies(c) and flies’(c). Suppose that flies’(c) E S. By Lemma 2.4, flies(c) E S iff the 
premise 
bird(c), notab(r1, c), not flies’(c) 
of rule (11) is satisfied by S, which is obviously not the case. 
A similar argument works for make-top. By Proposition 2.2, this implies that ll is 
categorical. q 
It is worth noting that the above techniques allow us to express priorities between defaults. 
Consider, for instance, the default: “Things normally do not fly.” It can be written as 
-flies(X) t thing(X), not ab(r2, X), not flies(X) 
where r2 is the name of this rule. This default shall not be applicable to birds (which 
are also things), whose flying abilities are determined by more specific information. This 
means birds are weak exceptions to rule r2, which can be expressed by the rule 
ab(r2, X) t not -bird(X) 
The resulting program, together with rules expressing the subclass+lass relationship be- 
tween birds and things, gives a correct formalization of the extended hierarchy. 
The next example from [81] demonstrates how extended logic programs can be used to 
reason about unknown information in the context of deductive databases. 
Example 3.3.4. Consider a collection of rules El. 
1. eligible(X) t highGPA(X) 
2. eligible(X) +- minority(X), fairGPA(X) 
3. -eligible(X) +- -fairGPA(X), -highGPA(X) El 
4. interview(X) + not eligible(X), not -eligible(X) I 
used by a certain college for awarding scholarships to its students, where highGPA and 
f airG PA represent possible examination scores. The first two rules are self-explanatory 
(we assume that variable X ranges over a given set of students). The third rule says that X 
is not eligible if his CPA is neither fair nor high, while the fourth rule can be viewed as a 
formalization of the statement: 
“The students whose eligibility is not determined by the first three rules should be interviewed by 
the scholarship committee.” 
In its epistemic form, the rule says: “interview(X) if neither eligible(X) nor -eligible(X) 
is known.” In general, the statement “the truth of an atomic statement p is unknown” can 
be represented by 
not p, not-p. (15) 
Let us now assume that the above program is to be used in conjunction with a database DB 
consisting of literals specifying values of the predicates minority, highGPA, fairGPA. We 
do not assume completeness of the database. Some of the entries about the GPA and the 
minority status may be missing. 
Consider, for instance, the DB consisting of the following two facts about one of the 
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students: 
5. fairGPA(ann) t 
6. -highGPA(ann) t 
(Notice that DB contains no information about the minority status of Ann.) Intuitively, it is 
easy to see that rules 1.-6. allow us to conclude neither eZigibZe(ann) nor -eZigibZe(ann). 
Therefore, the eligibility of Ann for the scholarship is unknown, and by rule 4, she must 
be interviewed. Formally, this argument is reflected by the fact that program Et consisting 
of rules 1.6. has exactly one answer set: 
{f airGPA(ann), -highGPA(ann), interuiew(ann)). 
However, if Mike is a student with highGPA or a minority student with a fairGPA, the 
corresponding program will entail eZigibZe(mike). 0 
The representation (15) works properly for categorical extended logic programs. The 
corresponding representation in the more general cases will be discussed in Example 5.5.3. 
Example 3.3.5. In this example, we modify the program Y from Example 2.2.6 to allow 
temporal projection with incomplete knowledge about the initial situation. The law of 
inertia is expressed as 
r-1: hoZds(F, res(A, S)) t hoZds(F, S), nof ab(rl, A, F, S), 
not -hoZds(F, res(A, S)) 
12: -hoZds(F, res(A, S)) c -hoZds(F, S), natab(rz, A, F, S), 
not hoZds(F, res(A, S)) 
The effects of actions are represented by 
hoZds(Zoaded, res(Zoad, S)) t 
and 
-hoZds(aZive, res(shoot, S)) +- hoZds(Zoaded, S) 
To represent the priority of the effect rules over the inertia rule, we have the cancellation 
rules: 
ab(r2, load, loaded, S) + 
and 
ab(rl, shoot, alive, S) + not -hoZds(Zoaded, S) 
Let SO be the initial state, and suppose we are given that 
hoZds(aZiue, SO) t 
and 
-hoZds(Zoaded, SO) +- 
(16) 
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It is easy to see that the resulting program entails 
hoZds(aZive, res(shoot, SO)) and 
+zoZds(aEiue, res(shoot, res(wuit, res(Zoad, SO)))). 
Now, suppose we have incomplete information about the initial state, i.e., we know 
hoZds(aZiue, so), 
but we have no information about the gun being initially loaded. The resultant program 
still entails 
-hoZds(uZiue, res(shoot, res(Zoud, so))) 
but remains undecided about 
hoZds(uZiue, res(shoot, so)). 
Notice that, as in the birds example above, we needed to replace the cancellation rule 
from Example 2.2.6 by a stronger rule (16). If this were not done, the program would 
produce the counter-intuitive conclusion 
hoZds(uZiue, res(shoot, so)). 
It can be shown that the above program is an extension of program Y and is categorical. 0 
The examples demonstrate the power of extended logic programs as a knowledge repre- 
sentation language, and outline basic ideas of the methodology of representing knowledge 
about action and time. 
3.2. Other Semantics of Extended Logic Programs 
So far, we have based our discussion on the answer set semantics of extended logic programs. 
Several other semantics of extended logic programs are suggested in the literature [5, 173, 
174, 175, 193, 1181. We now discuss some of them. 
The formulation of well-founded semantics of general logic programs in [22] can be 
extended to define the well-founded semantics [193] of extended logic programs. More 
precisely, let us consider Gn(S) = b(IIs). Then, for any extended logic program II, the 
fixpoints of Gn defines the answer-set semantics, and {Zfp(Gi), gfp(Gh)} defines the 
well-founded semantics. A literal 1 is true (resp. false) w.r.t. the well-founded semantics 
of an extended logic program Il if 1 E Zfp(Gk) (resp. 1 q! gfp(Gi)). Otherwise, Z is said 
to be undeJined. 
Pereira et al. [ 1741 show that this definition gives unintuitive characterizations for several 
programs. 
Example 3.3.6. Consider the program IIn: 
a tnotb 
b + notu 
-a t 
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The well-founded semantics infers -a to be true and a and b to be unknown with respect to 
the above program. Intuitively, b should be inferred true and a should be inferredfalse. 0 
Example 3.3.7. Consider the program II 1: 
b +-not-b 
and the program II2 
a cnot-a 
-a t nota 
The well-founded semantics infers b to be true with respect o Ill and infers b to be undejned 
with respect to Ill U l-I2 even though II2 does not have b in its language. 0 
To overcome the unintuitiveness of the well-founded semantics, Pereira et al. [I741 
propose an alternative semantics of extended logic programs which we refer to as the Q- 
well-founded semantics. We now define the Q-well-founded semantics. 
Dejinition 3.3 [174]. Let ll be an extended logic program. S( II), the seminormal version 
of l-l, is obtained by replacing each rule of the form (7) by the rule 
Lo tLt ,..., Lm,notL,+l ,..., notL,,not-Lo (17) 
0 
Dejinition 3.4 [174]. For any extended logic program II, the function Rn is defined as 
Qn(x) = Gn(Gs(n)(X)). 0 
Dejinition 3.5 [174]. A set of literals E is said to be an Q-extension of an extended logic 
program II iff 
1. E is a fixpoint of S2n. 
2. E is a subset of (Gs(n)(E)) 0 
Pereira et al. [ 1741 show that if an extended logic program has an !&extension, then an 
is a monotonic function, and hence has a least fixpoint. The Q-well-founded semantics is 
defined as {Zfp(!An), Gs(n)(Zfp(C2n))}. Entailment w.r.t. the Q-well-founded semantics 
is defined as follows: A literal 1 is true (resp. faZse> w.r.t. the Q-well-founded semantics of 
an extended logic program Il if 1 E Zfp(S2n) (resp. 1 $ Gs(n)(lfp(SZn))). Otherwise, 1 is 
undefined. 
Example 3.3.8 [174]. Consider the following program II3: 
c +- notb 
b + nota 
a tnota 
-b 
The above program has {c, -b} as the only Q-extension. The Q-well-founded semantics is 
given by {{c, lb}, (c, a, -b}}. 0 
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Before we end this section, we would like to briefly mention another class of semantics 
of extended logic programs based on contradiction removal [44,237, 17 1, 851. 
To illustrate the problem, let us consider the program lI4: 
1. ptnot‘q 
2. -p + 
3. St 
Obviously, under the answer set semantics, this program is inconsistent. It is possible to 
argue, however, that inconsistency of lI4 can be localized to the rules (1.) and (2.) and 
should not influence the behavior of the rest of the program, i.e., l&‘s answer to query s 
should be yes and the rules causing inconsistency should be neutralized. There are several 
approaches to doing that. One, suggested in [ 1181, modifies the answer set semantics to 
give preference to rules with negative conclusions (viewed as exceptions to general rules). 
Under the corresponding entailment relation, l$ concludes s and -p. Another possibility 
is to first identify literals responsible for contradiction, in our case q . After that, q can be 
viewed as abducible,13and hence I74 will entail s, -p, and q. Another possibility arises 
when R-well-founded semantics is used as the underlying semantics of Fl4. In this case, 
we may want to have both q and -q undefined. This can be achieved by expanding ll4 by 
new statements q t not q and -q t not -4. The resulting program l-l5 entails (w.r.t. 
the R-well-founded semantics) -p and s and infers p to befalse. The last idea is developed 
to a considerable length in [ 17 1, 1691. 
4. DISJUNCTIVE LOGIC PROGRAMS 
In this section, we will discuss a further extension of the language of extended logic pro- 
grams by the means necessary to represent disjunctive information about the world. Minker 
pioneered the use of disjunctions in the context of logic programming.141n [153], he con- 
siders positive disjunctive logic programs defined as collections of first-order clauses of the 
form 
B1 A.. A B, > A1 v . . . v A,, (18) 
where As and Bs are atoms. The type of incompleteness expressible in these logic programs 
is, however, rather limited since their semantics, suggested in [ 1531, is closely related to the 
notion of minimal model and implicitly assumes a form of the closed world assumption. 
This work was generalized and/or modified by various authors (an overview can be found 
in [ 183, 1331) but most of the approaches till assume the closed world assumption, and 
hence do not allow the representation of such simple forms of incompleteness as missing 
information in the database tables, null values, and partial definitions. 
In this section, we discuss another approach to expressing disjunctive information based 
on the expansion of the language of extended logic programs by a new connective or called 
epistemic disjunction [82]. (Notice the use of the symbol or instead of classical V. The 
meaning of or is given by the semantics of disjunctive logic programs and differs from that 
of V. The meaning of a formula A v B is “A is true or B is true,” while a rule A or B t is 
13Abducible literals are literals that can be assumed true if necessary. For more details, see Section 8. 
141ndependently Loveland [ 1341 considered extensions to Horn logic programs which he called near 
Horn logic program:. His main concern was efficient implementation [134, 2231. 
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interpreted epistemically and means “A is believed to be true or B is believed to be true.” 
While for any atom A, A v -A is always true, it is possible that A or -A may not be true.) 
By disjunctive logic programs, we will mean a collection of rules of the form 
LO or . . . Or Lk + &+I,. . . &, not I&+], . . . , not L, (19) 
where Ls are literals. When the Ls are atoms, we refer to the program as a normal disjunctive 
program. When m = n and the LiS are atoms, we refer to the program as a positive 
disjunctive logic program. 
The definition of an answer set of a disjunctive logic program l7 [195, 821 is almost 
identical to that of extended logic programs. Let us first consider disjunctive logic programs 
without negation as failure. 
An answer set of a disjunctive logic program15fI not containing not is a smallest (in a 
sense of set-theoretic inclusion) subset S of Lit such that 
(i) for any rule LO or . . . or Lk t &+I . . . L, from fl, if &+I, . . . , L, E S, then 
for some i, 0 ( i 5 k, Li E S; 
(ii) if S contains a pair of complementary literals, then S = Lit. 
Unlike extended logic programs without not, a disjunctive logic program without not may 
have more than one answer sets. For example, the program 
p(a) or p(b) +- 
has two answer sets {p(u)} and {p(b)). We denote the answer sets of a disjunctive logic 
program l7 that does not contain not by cr(fI). We are now ready to define the answer set 
of an arbitrary disjunctive logic program. 
A set S of literals is an answer set of a disjunctive logic program fI if S E rr(lTs) where 
IIs is defined in Definition 3.1. 
We expand the notion of query to a formula made of literals, A and or. Let S be a set of 
literals, p be an atom, and f and g be formulas. 
1. p is true in S if p is in S and false in S if -p is in S. 
2. f A g is true in S iff f is true in S and g is true in S. 
3. f A g is false in S iff f is false in S or g is false in S. 
4. f or g is true in S iff f is true in S or g is true in S. 
5. f or g is false in S iff f is false in S and g is false in S. 
6. -f is true(false) in S iff f is false (true) in S. 
A formula is said to be true(false) with respect to a disjunctive logic program if it is 
true@lse) in all answer sets of the program; otherwise, it is said to be unknown. 
We again stress the difference between the epistemic or and the classical V. Consider a 
program consisting of the rule 
aorbt 
This program has two answer sets [a} and (b}. The truth of formula (a or -a) is unknown 
with respect to this program; i.e., unlike a v -a, this formula is not a tautology. 
t5For positive disjunctive logic programs, this definition is similar to Minker’s [ 1531 original definition. 
For a precise relationship, see Proposition 4.4. 
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To do some simple reasoning in disjunctive logic programs, we will use a version of the 
“supportiveness” Lemma 2.4. 
Proposition 4.1. For any answer set S of a disjunctive logic program II: 
(a) For any ground instance of a rule of the type (19) from II, if 
{&+I.. . &,) 2 S and 
{L m+l... L,)f-lS= 
then there exists an i, 0 5 i 5 k such that Li E S. 
(b) If S is a consistent answer set of Il and L E S, then there exists a ground instance 
of a rule of the type (19) from Il such that 
(Lkfl . . . L,) C S and 
{L,+l . . . L,) II S = 0, and 
{L,,...Lk)nS={L). 0 
The definition of stratification can also be applied to disjunctive logic programs that do 
not contain 1. The corresponding theorem guarantees existence of answer sets for such 
programs. 
Theorem 4.2. Any stratified disjunctive logicprogram that does not contain - has an answer 
set. 0 
Let us look at a few simple examples of disjunctive logic programs and their answer sets. 
Let II0 = (p(a) or p(b) t). 
It is easy to see that [p(a)) and (p(b)) are the only answer sets of Ilc since they are the 
only minimal sets closed under its rule. 
Let IIt = Ilo U {r(X) t not p(X)). 
Obviously, this program is stratified, and hence by Theorem 4.2 has an answer set S. 
By part (a) of Proposition 4.1, S must either contain p(a) or contain p(b). Part (b) of 
Proposition 4.1 guarantees that S does not contain both. Suppose S contains p(a). Then, 
by part (a), S contains r(b), and by part(b), it contains nothing else, and hence, {p(a), r(b)) 
is an answer set of Ill. Similarly, we can show that (p(b), r(a)) is an answer set of II 1 and 
that there are no other answer sets. 
4.1. Representing Knowledge Using Disjunctive Logic Programs 
The following examples demonstrate the methodology of representing disjunctive informa- 
tion in commonsense reasoning. We start with representing the CWA in the presence of 
disjunctive information. 
The following example shows the interplay between epistemic disjunction and the rep- 
resentation of the closed world assumption from previous sections. 
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Example 4.4. I. We will first use the representation of the CWA in (9). Let no = {p(u) or 
P@) +I, and nz = no U {-p(X) + not p(X)}, and assume that the language of II2 
contains three constants a, b, and c. It is easy to check that fI2 has two answer sets: 
{~(a>, -p(b), -P(C)) and I-P@>, p(b), -P(C)). 
and hence l72 answers “no” to the query p(c) and answers “unknown” to the queries p(a) 
and p(b), which corresponds to our intuition. 
Notice that l-l2 answers no to the query p(u) A p(b) (recall that l-lo’s answer to the 
same query is unknown). This shows that the addition of the closed world assumption 
supplies the epistemic or with some degree of exclusiveness not present in it originally. 
The appropriateness of this effect for knowledge representation is an interesting subject for 
further investigation. 
The effect can be avoided by using a weaker form of the CWA which views a and b as 
exceptions. This form can be expressed by the rules 
-p(X) t not p(X), not ub(r, X) 
ub(r, a) +- 
ub(r, 6) + 
where r is the name of the first rule. 
Ilo with the above three rules has the answer sets 
{p(a), ab(r, a), ab(r, b), -p(c)1 and {p(b), a&-, a>, Wr, b), -P(C)). 
Its answers to the queries p(u), p(b), and p(c) are the same as flz’s, while its answer to 
the query p(u) A p(b) is unknown. 0 
The next example was used in [ 1811 to demonstrate difficulties with representing disjunc- 
tive information in Reiter’s default logic. It is worth noting that it has a natural representation 
in the language of disjunctive programs. 
Example 4.4.2. Consider the following story [ 1811: 
Normally, aperson’s left arm is usable, but a person with a broken left arm is an exception, 
and similarly for the right arm. Suppose also that we remember seeing Matt with a broken 
left arm or a broken right arm, but we do not remember which. 
Let us assume that our specification only allows updates about broken arms, and that we 
have CWA for “broken arms” predicates. 
Let us represent his information in the language of disjunctive logic programs. 
Under our assumptions, the first statement of the specification can be translated into 
Ih_usuble(X) t not ub(l, X) 
ub(l, X) + Zh_broken(X) 
rh_usubZe(X) t not ub(r, X) 
ab(r, X) c rh_broken(X) 
The second statement may be represented as 
lh_broken(mutt) or rhbroken(mutt) + . 
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CWA about the broken arms is expressed by the following two rules: 
-Ihdroken(X) t not I/r-broken(X) 
7-h-broken(X) + not rh_broken(X) 
The disjunctive logic program consisting of the above seven rules has two answer sets: 
{lh_broken(matt), ab(E, mutt), rh_usable(matt), ~rh_broken(matt)} and 
{rh_broken(matt), ab(Z, mutt), lh_usabZe(matt), --rh_broken(matt)} 
and therefore infers 
rh_usable(matt) or lh_usable(matt) 
which correspond to our intended specification. Correctness of our method of representa- 
tion does not depend on the above assumptions. Representations using more complicated 
translations of normative statements (such as 12 and 13 in Section 3.1) work equally well. 
However, as shown in [181], similar versions of the default logic representation lead to 
counter-intuitive results. 0 
In the next example, we consider a knowledge base containing a default rule about 
predicate a, and show that caution should be exercised when expanding the knowledge 
base by new disjunctive rules about a. 
Example 4.4.3. Suppose that a language C contains a list of names such as mike, john, 
mary, and assume that a disjunctive logic program, l-l3, includes the following complete 
list of professors in a computer science department: 
1. p(mike, cs) + 
2. p(john, cs) + 
To express the completeness of the list, we will again use the closed world assumption 
3. -p(X, Y) t not p(X, Y). 
Let us also assume that we want to represent he following information about the department: 
(i) “As a rule, professors in the computer science department have vax accounts. This 
rule is not applicable to Mike. He may or may not have an account.” 
In its most general form, this is formalized as 
4. a(X, uax) + p(X, cs), not ab(r4, X), not la(X, vax), 
where an (X, Y) stands for “X has an account on Y,” and ab(r4, X) means “(4) is not 
applicable to X.” The second statement is translated as 
5. ab(r4, mike) + 
It is easy to see that the resulting theory entails a(john, uax), but stays undecided about 
Mike. 
Suppose, now, that we have learned the following additional information: 
(ii) “every computer science professor has one of the va,x or IBM accounts, but not 
both.” 
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In the absence of any other information about computer accounts, this can be represented 
by the rules 
6. a(X, uax) or a(X, ibm) c p(X, cs) 
7. -a(X, ibm) + a(X, uax), p(X, cs) 
8. -u(X, uux) t u(X, ibm), p(X, cs) 
It may appear that to find a formalization of both (i) and (ii), it suffices to merge their 
formalizations. Unfortunately, this does not work. To see why, let us notice that we 
expect the resulting theory to conclude, among other things, that John has a vax account. 
This is, however, not the case since the merge will have two belief sets: one containing 
u(john, uux) and another containing u(john, ibm). The problem occurs because of the 
two contrary rules (4) and (8) which can both be applied to the same professor X, and no 
priority is given to the rule (4). The correct solution requires a finer analysis of the situation. 
First, we should notice that the rule (4) should be used wheneverpossible, and that the new 
information is only applicable to the professors who are exceptions to (4). Two types of 
exceptions are possible: first, we may know that a professor X does not have a vax account. 
In this case, we should incorporate the information that X has an ibm account. This is easily 
done by adding the rule 
9. u(X, ibm) t -u(X, uux), p(X, cs). 
Now, the predicate a is unknown only for the professors known to be abnormal. For such 
professors, we have reason to prefer neither ibm nor vax accounts, and this lack of preference 
is reflected by the rule 
6’. u(X, uux) or u(X, ibm) t p(X, cs), ub(r4, X). 
Our new formalization, D is 
1. p(mike, cs) t 
2. p(john, cs) t 
3. -p(X, Y) t not p(X, Y) 
4. u(X, vux) +-- p(X, cs), not ub(r4, X), not -u(X, 1 
5. ub(r4, mike) t 
6’. u(X, UUX) or u(X, ibm) t p(X, cs), ub(r4, X) 
7. -u(X, ibm) t p(X, cs), u(X, uux) 
8. TZ(X, UUX) + p(X, cs), u(X, ibm) 
9. u(X, ibm) t -u(X, uux), p(X, cs) 
Mzx) 
*v 
The new formalization, 2) implies that john has a VM account, while mike has either a 
vax account or an ibm account, but not both. 2, apparently satisfies the specification and 
may be used with any collection of facts formed by predicate symbols p and a. 0 
4.2. Answering Queries 
There has been considerable research in developing query-answering methods for posi- 
tive disjunctive programs [ 166, 159, 71, 133, 1021. It should be noted that for positive 
programs, minimal models coincide with answer sets. By using the renaming technique 
(as in Section 3) of replacing negative literals -p by new positive atoms p’, we can ex- 
tend the query-answering methods to answer queries in the presence of 1. For disjunctive 
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programs with not, Fernandez et al. and Inoue et al. [103] have developed bottom-up 
query-answering methods. 
In this section, we present the query-answering algorithm for disjunctive logic programs 
of [ 1031 which is a bottom-up procedure based on computing the answer sets of a positive 
disjunctive logic program. It extends the approach of computing the stable models of 
general logic programs as described in Section 2 to compute the answer sets of disjunctive 
logic programs. Like the computation of the stable models, a disjunctive logic program 
is transformed to a disjunctive program without nor. [IO31 show that the answer sets 
of the transformed program that satisfy certain additional properties (similar to integrity 
constraints in databases) are the answer sets of the original disjunctive program. In the 
transformation, we use new atoms that are constructed from the literals of the original 
program. For each literal L, we add the new atoms L- and L+ to the language of the 
transformation. Intuitively, L+ means L is believed to be true and L- means L is not 
believed to be true. We also use some intermediate atoms denoted by Xis. Recall that the 
symbol z denotes the literal opposite in sign to L. 
The transformation of l-l [103], rrz(lI) is obtained by translating each rule of the dis- 
junctive logic program of the form (19) to the following disjunctive logic program (without 
nor) 
X0 or . . . or& OrLz+l Or . . . orLz + &+I, . . . . .& 
+ x0 
L, t x0 
Lo +- x0 
L, t & 
Lk + Xk 
Definition 4.1. Let l7 be a disjunctive logic program. Let M(rr2Q-l)) denote the collection 
of all the answer sets of rrz(lT), and G(rrz(ll)) denote the answer sets in M(rrz(lT)) 
that satisfy the following (qualifying) properties: l6 
(a) An answer set cannot have both L- and L 
(b) An answer set cannot have both L- and L+ 
(c) An answer set cannot have both L and ‘z 
(d) An answer set cannot have both L+ and z 
(e) An answer set cannot have both L+ and (z)+ 
(f) If an answer set has L+ it must also have L. 
We define answerset to be the set of minimal elements of the set {S: S’ E Q(rr2(lI)), 
and S is obtained from S’ by removing all atoms with + and - in their superscript, and the 
intermediate atoms Xis}. 0 
%I the context of databases, such properties are encoded as integrity constraints. 
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Theorem 4.3 [103]. For any consistent disjunctive logic program l-I, answerset is the 
set of answer sets of lI. 0 
Example 4.4.4 [103]. Consider the following version of Example 4.2 from [103]: 
Zh_usabZe(X) t person(X), not abl (X) 
rh_usabZe(X) + person(X), not abz(X) 
abl(X) t -Zh_usabZe(X) 
abz(X) t -rh_usabZe(X) 
person(a) t 
-Zh_usabZe(a) or -rh_usable(a) t 
The transformation of Il consists of the following program: 
xl(X) or abT(X) + person(X) 
abc(X) + ~1 (X) 
Ih_usabZe(X) c xl(X) 
x2(X) or abz(X) t person(X) 
ah;(X) +- x2(X) 
rh_usabZe(X) t x2(X) I tr2UU 
42 
abl (X) t -Zh_usabZe(X) 
abz(X) t -rh_usabZe(X) 
person(a) t 
-Zh_usabZe(a) or -rh_usabZe(a) t , 
The answer sets of tr2( n) obtained using model generation techniques are 
{person(a), -Zh_usubZe(a), abl(a), rh_usabZe(u), abT(a), abz(u), q(a)} 
[person(a), -Zh_usabZe(a), abl(a), abF(u), abl(a)} 
{person(a), -rh_usubZe(a), ubz(a), Zh_usabZe(a), abl(a), abr(a), xl(a)} 
(person(a), -rh_usubZe(a), abz(a), abt(a), abz(a)} 
The second answer set has abl(a) and does not have abz(u), and the fourth answer set has 
abf (a) and does not have ubl (a); hence, they do not satisfy property (d) of Definition 4.1. 
The first and the third answer sets satisfy all the properties of Definition 4.1, and the answer 
sets of Il are obtained from them by removing all atoms with + and - in their superscript 
and the atoms with predicate x, i.e., the answer sets of Il are 
{person(a), -Zh_usabZe(u), abl(a), rh_usabZe(a)} 
and {person(a), -rh-usable(a), aba(a), Zh-usable(a)]. 0 
Answer sets of disjunctive logic programs can be obtained using model generation tech- 
niques [21, 71, 72, 1411. Inoue et al. [ 1031 extend the model generation theorem prover 
(MGTF’) [72] to compute the answer sets of the program obtained using tr2. Their method 
avoids using the intermediate atoms Xi s. 
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4.3. Other Approaches to Disjunctive Logic Programs 
Minker [153] defines the model-theoretic semantics for positive disjunctive logic programs 
(viewed as first-order clauses of the form (18)) based on minimal Herbrand models. Ac- 
cording to this semantics, a literal is a consequence of a disjunctive program if and only 
if it is true in every minimal Herbrand model of the program. The syntactic counterpart 
for inferring negative literals, called the generalized closed world assumption, is defined as 
follows (we will use the terminology from [88]). A disjunction D of ground atoms is called 
essential w.r.t. theory T if T b D and no subdisjunction of D is entailed by T. A ground 
atom is calledfreefor negation in T if it does not belong to any clause essential in T. Let 
7 be the set of negations of all ground atoms free for negation in T. Then 
GCWA(T) = l?. 
Minker [ 1531 proves that for T with a finite number of constants and no function symbols, 
T U GCWA(T) classically entails a literal 4 iff 4 is true in all minimal Herbrand models 
of T. This result was extended to arbitrary T in [88, 2201. 
The following proposition establishes the connection between Minker’s semantics and 
answer set semantics of disjunctive logic programs. 
Proposition 4.4 1781. Let Tl be a program consisting of rules of the form Ac or . . . or 
Ak t Ak+l . . A, (where As are atoms), and the closed world assumptions of the 
form 
-p(X) t not p(X), for all predicates in lT. 
Now, let o(H) be H’s first-order counterpart consisting of clauses 
Ak+l A... AA, >&V...V&. 
Then, for any literal query 4, ll’s answer to q under answer set semantics coincides with 
the answer to q by c~(lI) under Minker’s semantics. cl 
Minker’s GCWA was later extended by many people [242, 88, 931 in several various 
directions. Several semantics have been proposed for normal disjunctive programs (disjunc- 
tive programs with not, but without -) [133,207, 16,15,208, 194,211, IO]. The semantics 
proposed in 191 (DWFS-Disjunctive Well-Founded Semantics) uses a fix?oint operator 
similar to the fixpoint operators used in [234, 1891 to define the well-founded semantics, 
and iterates it starting from a “nothing is known” initial state until a fixpoint is reached. The 
semantics proposed in [ 161 (GDWFS-Generalized Disjunctive Well-Founded Semantics) 
uses a fixpoint operator which contains an additional model-theoretic part. Some of the 
other interesting semantics of normal disjunctive programs suggested in the literature are 
the extended well-founded semantics of Ross [208]. stationary semantics by Rrzymusinski 
[194], and the possible world semantics by Sakama [21 I]. Minlcer and Ruiz [160] discuss 
extensions of the various semantics of normal disjunctive logic programs to disjunctive 
logic programs (they refer to it as extended disjunctive logic programs). 
The following examples give a flavor of the differences between the various semantics 
of disjunctive logic programs. 
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Example 4.4.5. Consider the program Dt consisting of the following rules: 
P(U) or P(b) + 
p(a) -+ 
All semantics of normal disjunctive logic programs, except the possible model semantics 
[21 l] and the WGCWA [205,210], infer p(b) to befalse with respect o the above program. 
The possible model semantics infers p(b) to be unknown. 0 
Example 4.4.6. Consider the program ll4 of Example 2.2.10. DWPS and stationary seman- 
tics infer p to be unknown with respect o the program ll4. But GDWFS and the answer-set 
semantics infer p to be true. 0 
Example 4.4.7. Consider the program ll3 of Example 2.2.9. DWFS and stationary se- 
mantics infer p to be true with respect to the program ll3, but ll3 does not have any 
answer-sets. 0 
Example 4.4.8. Consider the following program, D2: 
a tnotb 




The extended well-founded semantics [208] and the GDWFS do not infer a to be true from 
the above program. But the stationary semantics, the DWFS, and the answer-set semantics 
infer a to be true. 0 
A more detailed comparison of the various semantics of normal disjunctive logic pro- 
grams can be found in [8, 39,401. [8] gives a framework for the various semantics based 
on iterating a fixpoint operator (also known as an information accumulating operator) from 
a “nothing is known” initial state. Dix [39,40] studies the various semantics based on their 
behavior as a nonmonotonic entailment relation. 
5. EPISTEMIC LOGIC PROGRAMS 
The framework of disjunctive logic programs is the most general form of logic programming 
that we have discussed so far. In disjunctive logic programs, we use two forms of negation, 
the classical - and the nonmonotonic not. The semantics of a disjunctive logic program is 
defined in terms of answer sets. The answer to a query is true if it is true in all the answer 
sets. But there is no way to reason in the language itself about a particular literal being true 
in all the (OF some of the) answer sets. 
The following example demonstrates the need for an extension of the language of dis- 
junctive logic programs that will allow such reasoning: 
Example 5.5.2. Consider the following information. We know that 
(A) Either “john” or “peter” is guilty (of murder). 
(B) “a person is presumed innocent if (s)he cannot be proven to be guilty.” 
(C) “a person can get a security clearance if we have no reason to suspect that (s)he is 
guilty.” 
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Statement (A) can easily be written as a disjunctive rule: 
AI: guiZty(john) or guiZty(peter) t 
If we try to write statement (B) in the language of disjunctive logic programs using not, we 
have 
B1: presumed-innocent(X) +- not guilty(X) 
This, however, is not appropriate because the program consisting of A 1 and B1 has two an- 
swer sets {guiZty(john), presumed_innocent(peter)} and {guiZty(peter), 
presumed_innocent(john)}, and therefore presumed_innocent(john) is inferred to be 
unknown. Intuitively, we should be able to infer that presumed_innocent(john) is true. 
Hence, the operator not in the body of B1 is not the one we want. 
Similarly, if we consider representing statement C in the language of disjunctive logic 
programs using not, we have 
Ct : cleared(X) +- not guilty(X) 
But Cl is not appropriate because the program consisting of Al and Cl has two answer 
sets: {guiZty(john), cZeared(peter)) and [guiZty(peter), cZeared(john)}, and we infer 
cZeared(john) to be unknown. Intuitively, we would like to infer that cZeared(john) is 
faZse. Hence, we should expand our language and redefine answer sets in such a way that 
(B2) We would infer presumed-innocent (a) iff there is at least one answer set that does 
not contain guilty(u). 
(C,) We would infer cleared(a) iff none of the answer sets contains guilty(u). III 
To capture the intuition in (B2) and (C2) in the above example, we use two unary 
operators K and A4 [781 and add them to our language. Intuitively, KL stands for L is 
known and ML stands for L may be believed. For a literal L and a collection of sets of 
literals S, we say that KL is true with respect to S (S b KL) iff L is true in all sets in 
S. ML is true with respect to S (S k ML) iff 1 is true in at least one set in S. We say 
S + -KL iff S k KL and we say S l= -ML iff S k ML. This means -KL is true 
with respect to S iff there is at least one set in S where L is not true, and -ML is true with 
respect to S iff there is no set in S where L is true. 
Using K and M, we can represent he statements (B) and (C) in the above example by 
the rules 
innocent(X) t -KguiZty(X) 
and 
cleared(X) t -MguiZty(X) 
We now define the syntax and semantics of epistemic logic programs which are ob- 
tained by adding K and M to the language of disjunctive logic programs. We refer to a 
literal L (without K or M) as an objective literal, and we refer to formulas of the form 
K L , ML , -K L, and -ML as subjective literals. An epistemic logic program is a collec- 
tion of rules of the form 
Llor . . . or Lk + &+I,. . . , G,,,, not &,,+I,. . . , not L, (20) 
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where the Ls are objective literals and the Gs are subjective or objective literals. 
Let T be an epistemic logic program and S be a collection of sets of literals in the 
language of T. By Ts we will denote the disjunctive logic program obtained from T by 
1. removing from T all rules containing subjective literals G such that S p G, 
2. removing from rules in T all other occurrences of subjective literals. 
Dejinition 5.1. A set S will be called a world view of T if S is the collection of all answer 
sets of TS. Elements of S will be called belief sets of T. The program TS will be called 
the reduct of T w.r.t. S. 0 
We now limit ourselves to epistemic programs with a unique world view. 
An objective literal is said to be true(false) with respect to an epistemic program if 
it is true(faZse) in all elements of its world view; otherwise, it is said to be unknown. 
A subjective literal is said to be true(false) with respect to an epistemic program if it is 
true(faZse) in its world view. Notice that subjective literals can not be unknown. 
Example 5.5.2. Consider the epistemic logic program Tl : 
1. guiZty(john) or guiZty(peter) + 
2. presumed-innocent(X) +- lKguilty(X) 
3. cleared(X) +- -Mguilty(X) 
4. -presumed-innocent(X) t not presumed-innocent(X) 
5. -cleared(X) +- not cleared(X) 
Let Sl=(guilty(john), presumed_innocent(john), presumed_innocent(peter), 
- cleared(john), -cleured(peter)} 
and Sz={guiZty(peter), presumed-innocent(john), presumed_innocent(peter), 
- cZeured(john), lcleured(peter)} 
and S={Sr, S2} 
Since MguiZty(john) and Mguilty(peter) are both true with respect to S, 
S k -Mguilty(john) and S k -Mguilty(peter), andtherefore, Tf doesnotcontainany 
ground instance of rule 3. Similarly, S + -KguiZty(john) and S + -Kguilty(peter), 
and hence Tf consists of the rules 
guilty(john) or guiZty(peter) +- 
presumed_innocent(john) +- 
presumed_innocent(peter) t 
-presumed-innocent(X) t not presumed-innocent(X) 
-cleared(X) t not cleared(X) 
The answer sets of Tf are S1 and S2. Hence, S is a world view of Tt . It is possible to show 
that S is the only world view of Tl [90], and therefore Tl + presumed_innocent(john), 
Tl + presumed_innocent(peter), T1 + -cZeured(john), and Tl + -cZeured(peter), 
which corresponds to our specification. 0 
Example 5.5.3 [Representing Unknown]. Consider the extended logic program El from 
Example 3.3.4. Recall that it consists of rules used by a certain college for awarding 
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scholarships to its students, and a rule saying “if the three rules do not determine the 
eligibility of a student, then (s)he should be interviewed.” 
In Example 3.3.4, we state that for categorical extended logic programs, (15) is an 
appropriate representation of unknown information. In this example, we show that rule 
(15) is not adequate for programs with multiple answer sets. 
Assume that, in addition to the rules (l)-(4) of Et, we have the disjunction 
5. fairGPA(mike) or highGPA(mike) t 
The epistemic logic program T3 consisting of (l)-(4) from Et and (5) has two answer sets: 
A1 = (highGPA(mike), eligible(mike)) 
A2 = {fairGPA(mike), interview(mike)} 
and therefore the reasoner modeled by T3 does not have enough information to 
establish Mike’s eligibility for the scholarship (i.e., answer to eligible(mike) is unknown.). 
Hence, intuitively, the reasoner should answer yes to the query 
interview(mike). But this is not achieved by the above representation. 
The intended effect is achieved by replacing (4) by the rule 
4’. interview(X) t -K eligible(X), -K-eligible(X) 
The epistemic logic program, &2, obtained by replacing (4) in Ty by (4’) has the world 
view A = {Al, AZ} where 
A1 = {highGPA(mike), eLigible(mike), interview(mike)), 
A2 = {fairGPA(mike), interview(mike)}. 
Hence, &2 answers unknown to the query eligible(mike) and yes to the query 
interview(mike), which is the intended behavior of the system. 0 
Hence, in general (for theories with multiple answer sets), the statement “the truth of an 
atomic statement P is unknown” is appropriately represented by 
-KP, -K-P. (21) 
So far, we have only considered epistemic programs with a unique world view. The 
following example shows epistemic programs that have multiple world views. 
Example 5.5.4. Let T2 consist of the rules 
1. p(a) or p(b) +- 
2. P(C) + 
3. 4(d) + 
4. -p(X) i- -MI)(X) 
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The specification T2 has three world views: 
At = ({q(d), P(C), p(a), -p(b), -p(d)]], 
A2 = I(#), P(C), p(b), -p(a), -p(d)]], and 
A3 = {{q(d), ~(a>, P(C), -p(d)), (q(d), p(b), P(C), -p(d)}}. 
Intuitively, A3 is preferable to the other two world views of T2 as it treats p(a) and p(b) in 
the same manner (unlike A 1 and AZ) and can be used to answer queries with respect to T2. 
For a detailed discussion on this phenomenon, see [78]. 0 
It remains to be seen if epistemic specifications with multiple world views will prove to 
be useful for knowledge representation. 
6. META-LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
In this section, we briefly discuss another important tool for representing knowledge, in par- 
ticular, knowledge in the domains containing logic programs as objects of discourse. Logic 
programs representing such knowledge are called meta-programs, and the process of their 
design is referred to as meta-programming. The situations requiring various types of meta- 
programming are numerous. (For many interesting examples and discussions, see [ 1151.) 
Meta-programming is used for representing and analyzing proof procedures, for assimilat- 
ing new knowledge and updating knowledge bases, for modeling knowledge and beliefs of 
multiple agents, for hypothetical reasoning, for structured and object-oriented logic pro- 
gramming, and for many other purposes. The literature on the subject is vast. Interesting 
meta-programs can be found in various textbooks on logic programming. Several workshop 
proceedings contain papers addressing theoretical problems related to meta-programming 
[7, 1501. Logic programming languages based on the ideas of meta-programming, such 
as Godel [99], Hilog [30], and Reflexive Prolog [31] among others, are beginning to gain 
ground in the logic programming community. In this paper, we will not even attempt to 
mention all directions of research related to meta-programming. Instead, we consider a few 
simple (but important) meta-programs and try to outline several fundamental points related 
to their construction and declarative meaning. 
We will start with an investigation of a two-argument proof predicate 
demo(H, 4) 
(first introduced in [ 114]), which expresses that the general logic program named II can be 
used to demonstrate the conclusion named q. 
The predicate demo and its numerous variations are used for many meta- 
programming applications. As an illustration, let us consider its possible use for knowledge 
assimilation. Assume that we need to design a program representing the following relation: 
assimilate(Old, NewInf o, New) 
between two general logic programs and an atom, where assimilate(Old, Newlnfo, 
New) means that the program New is the result of incorporating a new information Newlnfo 
into a program Old. 
Let us assume that the domain of this relation consists of general logic programs and 
atoms written in the language C (called object programs and atoms) and that a language 
,!$,, (which possibly includes C) contains some means of “naming” programs and atoms 
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from L. There are many different, and not equivalent, ways of doing this. One of the 
simplest is to view rules of L as terms of C,,, and to name programs by lists of their rules. 
For some applications, such a naming scheme is both appropriate and convenient. For 
other applications, however, it is not. For an interesting discussion on the pros and cons of 
different naming schemes, see [ 1151. 
Now we are ready to give a definition of assimilate. The informal specification of 
this relation will be developed concurrently with the formal one. The first attempt at the 
definition leads to a simple rule: 
assimilate(Old, Newlnfo, Old + Newlnfo) t 
where + is used to combine a program with an atom. We assume that L, contains such 
an operator. Its precise implementation depends on the choice of representation of object 
programs and atoms in C,,, . If an object program is represented by the list of names of its 
rules, then + can be implemented via simple append. 
Even though in some cases this definition is sufficient, it has at least two drawbacks. 
First, under the stable model semantics, the expansion of a program p t not p, q by a 
new atom q leads to incoherency, and hence some type of consistency checking is necessary. 
Even though the problem disappears if, say, well-founded semantics is used, it reappears if 
classical negation is allowed in C. For example, the program 
p +-notq,r 
‘P -+ 
when updated by the atom r is inconsistent under well-founded semantics. Second, in- 
discriminant addition of new information to a program may lead to unnecessary growth. 
Often, the following program, using the demo predicate, is suggested to remedy the second 
problem: 
assimilate(Old, Newlnfo, Old) +- demo(Old, Newlnfo) 
assimilate(Old, Newlnfo, Old i- Newlnfo) t not demo(Old, Newlnfo) 
The approach works fine if our programs are monotonic, i.e., do not contain not. In case 
of nonmonotonic programs, though, the first rule is too strong and may lead to a loss of 
information. Consider, for instance, a program old = (p t not q}, and assume that p 
is the new information which should be assimilated into the program old. Obviously, the 
above assimilate will not change the program. The problem occurs if we now learn q. 
The resulting program will be new = {p t not q, q t} which does not entail p, and 
therefore, the observation p becomes lost. 
To avoid the problem, let us introduce a new predicate monotonic(X, Y) (X is the 
monotonic part of a program Y), where the monotonic part of a program consists of the 
rules not containing negation as failure. Now, assimilate can be defined as follows: 
noupdate(Old, Newlnfo) t monotonic(X, Old), demo(X, Newlnfo) 
assimilate(Old, Newlnfo, Old) t noupdate(Old, Newlnfo) 
assimilate(Old, Newlnfo, Old + Newlnfo) t not noupdate(Old, Newlnfo) 
More complicated assimilation schemes may incorporate sophisticated consistency check- 
ing and various forms of abduction, but for simplicity’s sake, let us assume that this scheme 
is the one needed for our purposes and concentrate on the definition of demo. 
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Let us first assume that the first parameter of demo is fixed. The following program I is 
commonly used to define demo in this case: 
demo(empty) + 
demo(X&Y) t demo(X), demo(Y) 
demo(not(X)) c not demo(X) 
demo(X) t cZause(X, Y), demo(Y) 
For any general logic program ll, In denotes the program consisting of Z together with a 
fact of the form 
cZause(Ao, Al&. . . & A,& not (A,+l) &. . . & not (A,)) + 
for every rule of the form 
A0 +Al,..., A,, not Am+l, . . . , not A, and a fact of the form 
clause(A, empty) t 
for every rule A t in Il. 
The resulting program In is called (untyped) vanilla interpreter for Il. Notice that terms 
of the language of 2t-r are built from atoms of the language of Il, constant empty, and two 
function symbols not and &. 
In analysis of this program, we will follow [148, 1491. Since we use a stable model 
semantics, we should first prove that In has a stable model. Notice that In is neither 
stratified nor locally stratified. It is possible to show, however [ 1481, that for any stratified 
program Il, In is weakly stratified and hence categorical, i.e., it has a unique stable model 
11841. This implies that, at least for stratified programs, we should not worry about the 
existence of reasonable semantics for their vanilla meta-interpreters. So let us assume that 
Il is stratified. To check the correctness of It-r, we need to show that for every query q, 
l7 + q iff In + demo(q). Unfortunately, this is not always the case, even for ground 
queries, i.e., In is semantically incorrect. To see that, consider a program II0 consisting of 
the rules 
r(a) t not q(a) 
q(a) + not P(X) 
P(a) + 
and assume that a is the only object constant in the language of Ilo. It is easy to see that Ilo 
entails r(a). This conclusion is based on the fact that the Herbrand universe of Ilo consists 
of a single constant a and Ilc is identified with the set of all of its ground instances. Now, 
consider In,, which consists of Z and the facts 
clause(r(a), not(q(a))) + 
cluuse(q(a), not(p(X))) -+ 
cZause(p(a)) t 
Since predicate demo is supposed to represent entailment in Ilo, we expect In, to entail 
demo(r (a)). It is easy to see that this is not the case. The problem is caused by the fact that 
the Herbrand universe of Ino is much richer than that of Ilu. In addition to a, it contains 
terms p(u), r(p(a)), . . . . This causes incorrect treatment of the implicit quantifiers and 
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makes our representation of the relation clause incorrect. The object-level rule 
* q(a) + not P(X) 
is implicitly universally quantified. So is its meta-level counterpart 
** cZause(q(a), nor@(X))) t . 
Therefore, instead of expressing that the rule (*) belongs to the program Ilo, (**) states that 
for any term t of the language of In,,, q(u) + not p(t) belongs to Ilu, which is, of course, 
not the case. 
Despite this problem, vanilla meta-interpreters are frequently and successfully used 
in practice. We discuss the explanation of this phenomenon provided in [148], where 
the authors define a broad class of programs for which the above definition of demo is 
semantically correct. We give a slightly less general formulation here. 
A rule in a program II is called range restricted if any variable in the rule appears in a 
nonnegated atom in the rule’s body. A program Il is called range restricted if all its rules 
are range restricted. 
A program p(X) t q(X), not r(X) is range restricted while the program Ilo above 
or any program containing the rule p(X) c are not. The notion of range restriction is 
closely related to the notion of allowedness [229], and is extensively used for analysis of 
such notions as domain independence, floundering, and typing. It is probably fair to say 
that the vast majority of logic programs used in practical applicattons are range restricted. 
This observation explains the importance of the following. 
Theorem 6.1 [148]. Let n be a stratified, range-restricted program. Then, for every 
ground atom A from the language of II, 
l7 b A iffIn b demo(A). 0 
The result can be generalized to the following definition of a binary predicate demo: 
demo(T, empty) + 
demo(T, X&Y) t demo(T, X), demo(T, Y) 
demo(T, not(X)) t not demo(T, X) 
demo(T, X) + cEuuse(T, X, Y), demo(T, Y) 
where ternary clause is a natural generalization of its binary counterpart. This result implies 
correctness of the above definition of assimilate for stratified, range-restricted programs. 
Most likely, it can be pushed a little further. [ 1561 uses more general condition than range 
restriction. Stratified programs can be replaced by weakly stratified programs or, possi- 
bly, a suitable three-valued version of demo can be designed for arbitrary range-restricted 
programs under well-founded semantics. 
Let us now look at a slightly more complicated example. Consider, for instance, the 
following story from [ 171. 
Example 6.6.1. Consider a database IIt consisting of lists of students and courses, atomic 
formulas take(s, c) asserting that student s has taken course c, and a definition of predi- 
cate grad(s) which means that student s is eligible for graduation. We want to represent 
the property near-grad(s), meaning that student s is within one course of satisfying the 
graduation requirement. 
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In [ 171, this story is used to illustrate the power of intuitionistic logic programming with 
embedded implication +:. In such a language, near-grad is defined by the rule 
near-grad(S) t course(C), student(S), [grad(S) JG take(S, C)] 
Intuitively, this rule states that student s is nearly a graduate if there exists some course c 
such that, if the student took this course, then he could graduate. Intuitionistic semantics for 
such programs can be found in 1152, 17,861. Roughly speaking, to establish the derivability 
of near-grad(s) in the corresponding intuitionistic program Ilt under this semantics, one 
should add the rule take@, c) t to IIt and then try to prove grad(s). As noticed in 
[ 181, a similar meaning can be naturally expressed via the use of predicate demo(T, q) as 
follows: 
1. near-grad(S) t course(C), student(S), demo(Ill + tuke(S, C), grad(S)) 
To make the case slightly more interesting, let us consider a program lI2 consisting of Ill, 
definitions of meta predicates demo and clause, rule (l), and the rule (2) below: 
2. eZigibZe_forschoZurship(S) c student(S), not near-grad(S) 
Notice that the language of II2 includes both the object language of the original program 
and the meta language of demo, clause, and other associated meta-predicates. Programs 
with this property are called amalgamated. They were first introduced and investigated in 
[ 114, 141. To deal with such programs, one should address a basic problem associated with 
their meaning. The problem is caused by overloading the symbols in the language. Clearly, 
the predicate symbols of IIt occur both as predicate and function symbol in II2. [149] 
argues that, for a broad class of programs, this does not cause a problem. Apparently, the 
program above belongs to this class. It will be interesting to generalize this statement o 
programs from [ 171 and carefully investigate the relationship between the two approaches. 
More complicated (but also more general) meta-programming schemes are based on naming 
statements of object programs by ground terms on the meta-level, as in [14] and [99], on 
allowing sentence names themselves as in [204], or by other naming devices. Normally, 
these approaches require the development of special semantics. Additional complications 
occur if we allow self-referencing meta-programs. Consider, for instance, the rule 
3. grad(X) t sturted_earZier(X, Y), near-grad(Y), not ub(X) 
which says that if student X enrolled at the university a year earlier than Y and Y is near 
graduation, then normally X is eligible for graduation. 
It seems that to incorporate this rule in Il2, we should expand II2 by (3.) and replace 
Ill in rule (1.) by II2. This, of course, immediately makes the meaning of the program 
somewhat problematic. It is interesting to investigate to what extent such self-referencing 
programs are needed for knowledge representation, and how their semantics are related to 
each other and to more conventional semantics used in the above examples. 
Another intriguing question is the relationship between meta-programming and modal 
logics. A version of demo predicate formalizing entailment in classical logic was used in 
[ 1091 to represent knowledge of multiple agents. In particular, the paper contains an elegant 
meta-programming formalization of the three wise men problem. The object theory of the 
formalization is a classical theory containing disjunctive information. It may be interesting 
to see if this development can be linked to the epistemic specifications of Section 5. 
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7. REASONING IN OPEN DOMAINS 
7.1. The Semantics 
In this section, we discuss the modification of the semantics of logic programs and disjunc- 
tive databases which allows for reasoning in the absence of the domain-closure assumption 
[91]. This modification increases the expressive power of the language, and allows one to 
state explicitly the domain<losure and other assumptions about the domain of discourse 
in the language of logic programming. 
To understand the problem, let us recall that the definition of answer set of a program was 
given in two steps: first, the rules from ll were replaced by their ground instances, and then 
the definition of an answer set was given for programs not containing variables. Equating 
a program ll with the set of its ground instances, which occurs during the first step, was 
justified by the domain<losure assumption [1991 which asserts that allobjects in the domain 
of discourse have names in the language of l-I. Even though the assumption is undoubtedly 
useful for a broad range of applications, there are cases when it does not properly reflect the 
properties of the domain of discourse and causes unintended consequences. To illustrate 
this point, let us consider the following simple example from the literature: 
Example 7.7. I. Consider the positive logic program ll consisting of the rule 
and the query q = VXp(X). 0 
Under the domain-closure assumption, the semantics of this program is given by its 
least Herbrand model [231], i.e., the answer to VXp(X) is yes iff, for any ground term t in 
the language of l-l, the answer to p(t) is yes. Hence, U’s answer to a query q will be yes. 
However, if we add to ll an apparently unrelated fact r(b), the answer of the new program 
l-l* to the same query q becomes no. This lack of modularity, and the surprising ability of 
a program to entail positive facts not entailed by the corresponding classical theory, were 
recognized as problems of the semantics of general logic programs. Przymusinski in [ 1901 
termed the above problem the universal query problem, and suggested as a solution the 
semantics of general logic programs based on arbitrary (not necessarily Herbrand) minimal 
models. This allows him to avoid the universal query problem. Under the proper definition 
of the answer to a query, both l7 and ll* answer unknown to q. At the same time, the 
semantics from [190] does not diverge too far from the least Herbrand model semantics. 
In fact, these two semantics are equivalent for existential queries [95].170ther solutions of 
the universal query problem are suggested in [208, 1201, and [234]. They are based on the 
assumption that the language of any logic program contains constants and function symbols 
not appearing in it explicitly. Under this semantics, both programs ll and II* answer no to 
the query q which, in a sense, amounts to preferring open domains over closed ones. Such 
a preference appears somewhat arbitrary. Unless open or closed domain assumptions are 
stated explicitly, unknown seems to be the more intuitive answer to q. 
To obtain this answer, we will use a slightly different approach. We will parametrize the 
definition of an answer set w.r.t. the domains of l-l. For simplicity, we limit ourselves to 
extended logic programs. 
17T. Przymusinski’s approach is not limited to positive programs. In [ 1901, it is extended to perfect model 
semantics. 
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Let Il be a program over the language 1so. To give the semantics of II, we will first 
expand the alphabet of CO by an infinite sequence of new constants cl, . . , ck, . . We 
will call these new constants generic. The resulting language will be denoted by C,. By 
&, we will denote the expansion of CO by constants ct , . . , ck. &, where 0 5 k ( 00 
will stand for the set of all ground instances of II in the language &. The truth relation in 
the language & will be denoted by +k. The index will be omitted whenever possible. 
Definition 7.1. By k-answer set of II, we will mean a pair (k, B), where B is an answer set 
of n in the language &. cl 
In the new semantics, the answer to a query q will be determined by the collection of all 
consistent k-answer sets which we will call parametrized answer sets.18 
Example 7.7.2. Consider a language CO over the alphabet {a} and a general logic program 
Il from Example 7.1, consisting of the rule p(a) t. 
The following are parametrized stable models of II: 
l(O, {p(a)))), ((1, {p(a)))l, I(% {p(a)))}, . 
VXp(X) is true in the first model as the only constant in the language CO is a, while it is 
not true in all other models as the corresponding languages contain constants other than a. 
Hence, as intended, Ii’s answer to the query VXp(X) is unknown. q 
Example 7.7.3. Let us view rules p(a) t, q(a) t not p(X) as an extended logic program 
II over the language LO with the alphabet {a}. It is easy to see that the k-answer set of II is 
(k, {p(a))) if k = 0 and (k, {p(a), q(u)}) otherwise. Hence, Ii’s answer to the query q(u) 
is unknown. 0 
7.2. Applications 
Let us start by showing that the new semantics has enough expressive power for a formal- 
ization of the domain-closure assumption. 
Let ll be an arbitrary logic program in a language &. We expand CO by the unary 
predicate symbol h which stands for named elements of the domain. The following rules 
can be viewed as the definition of h: 
Hi. h(t) t (for every ground term t from CC,) 
H2. -h(X) t not h(X) 
The domain-closure assumption can be expressed by the rule 
DCA. t -h(X)19 
Example 7.7.4. Let Il be the extended logic program from Example 7.3 expanded by the 
181f ll is a general logic program, we will talk about parametrized stable models. 
19A rule t r with an empty conclusion is a shorthand for the rule --true t r. We will also assume 
that every logic program contains the rule true t. Rules of this sort prohibit the reasoner from believing in 
r and differ from -r t which asserts that r is false. 
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rules Ht , Hz and the closed world assumptions 
-p(X) + not P(X) 
-4(X) +- nor 4(X) 
for p and q (needed for equivalence of answers obtained in general and extended logic 
programs). The k-answer set of l7 is 
{(O, {h(a), p(a), -s(a)))), ifk = 0, and 
ilk, {h(a), -h(c1). . . -h(c,k), P(a), q(a), -p(c1>, -q(c1). . . ‘P(Ck), ‘4(Q), ))I, 
ifk > 0, 
and therefore, D’s answer to the query q(u) is unknown. The answer changes if II is 
expanded by the domain closure assumption (DCA). The resulting program, TIC, has the 
unique answer set ((0, {h(u), p(u), -q(a)})], and therefore, DC’S answer to q(u) is no, 
exactly the answer produced by the answer set semantics. 0 
It is possible to show that this is always the case, i.e., any disjunctive database lI in &I 
under the answer set semantics is equivalent in ,& to the database fI U (HI, Hz, DC A) 
under the open domain semantics. 
Now, we will briefly discuss an example that shows the use of domain assumptions and 
of the concept of named objects. 
Example 7.7.5. Consider a departmental database containing the list of courses which will 
be offered by a department next year, and the list of professors who will be working for the 
department at that time. Let us assume that the database knows the names of all the courses 
which may be taught by the department, but since the hiring process is not yet over, it does 
not know the names of all of the professors. This information can be expressed as follows: 
course(u) + course(b) + 
P-of(m) + P-of(n) + 
-course(X) t -h(X) 
The k-answer set of this program is 
(k, {course(u), course(b), -course(cl) . . -course(ck), prof(m), pr~f(n)))~’ 
and therefore, the above program answers no to the query 
3X (course(X) A -h(X)) 
and unknown to the query 
3x (prof(X) A -h(X)). 
Notice that, in this example, it is essential to allow for the possibility of unknown objects. 
Let us now expand the informal specification of our database by the closed world as- 
sumptions for predicates course and prof. The closed world assumption for course says that 
there are no other courses except those mentioned in the database and can be formalized by 
*OOf course, the answer set also contains h(a), h(b), h(m), h(n), -h(q). . +(ck). In the descriptions 
of answer sets, we will omit literals formed with h. 
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the standard rule 
-course(X) t not course(X). 
Using this assumption, we will be able to prove that a and b are the only courses taught 
in our department. In the case of predicate prof, however, this (informal) assumption is 
too strong-there may, after all, be some unknown professor not mentioned in the list. 
However, we want to be able to allow our database to conclude that no Ooze known to the 
database is a professor unless so stated. For that, we need a weaker form of the closed 
world assumption, which will not be applicable to generic elements. This can easily be 
accomplished by the following rule: 
-prof (X) t h(X), not prof (X). 
The k-answer set of the resulting program Il looks as follows: 
(k, {c(a), c(b), -c(m), -c(n), 3~1). . . -c(c& p(m), p(n), -p(a), -p(b)]), 
where c stands for course and p stands for Prof. This allows us to conclude, say, that a is 
not a professor without concluding that there are no professors except m and n. 0 
Open domain semantics is also useful for representing certain types of null values in 
databases [97]. An application to formalization of anonymous exceptions to defaults [57] 
can be found in [91]. [216] contains some results of query answering in open domain 
semantics. Related work in the context of autoepistemic logic and default logic can be 
found in [126, 1271. It will be interesting to further investigate the relationship between 
these approaches and that of this section. 
8. ABDUCTION 
Abduction is a method of reasoning which given a knowledge base T, and an observation Q 
finds possible explanations of Q in terms of a particular set of predicates referred to as the 
abducible predicates. Abduction was introduced by C. Peirce in the beginning of the century 
(see [ 197]), and has been used in AI for explaining observations, diagnosis, planning, and 
natural language understanding. [ 1121 gives a survey and analysis of work on the extension 
of logic programming to perform abductive reasoning. In this paper, we first briefly discuss 
the traditional role of abduction as a formalism for the explanation of observations and the 
connection between abduction and negation as failure. We then demonstrate how abductive 
logic programming can be used for both deduction and explanation. 
8.1. Abduction for Explaining Observations 
In this subsection, we briefly review the traditional view of abduction in AI as a mechanism to 
explain observations. C. Peirce viewed abduction as “probational adaptation of a hypothesis 
as explanation of observed facts, according to known rules.” This intuition is approximated 
by the following definition: 
An abductive framework is a triple (T, A, I), where T is a knowledge base with entailment 
relation +, Z is a set of first-order formulas called integrity constraints, and A is a set of 
abducible predicates. 
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Let T be a theory with the first-order entailment relation. It can belong to some class 
of theories, e.g., Horn, or be an arbitrary collection of first-order formulas. Abductive 
frameworks of this sort (most frequently used in AI applications) are normally combined 
with the definition of explanation which has the following form: 
For a given set of formulas G, called observations, A _C Lit(A) is said to be an abductive 
explanation of G with respect to (T, A, I) if 
1. TUA+FforanyformulaFEG, 
2. T U A satisfies I. 
There are various ways to define what it means for a knowledge base K B (T U A in our case) 
to satisfy an integrity constraint I. The theoremhood view requires that K B satisfies Z iff 
KB k Z (i.e., KB entails every element of Z), The consistency view requires KB U Z to 
be consistent. There are more sophisticated definitions: we will mention some of them in 
our further discussion. 
The following example, drawn from [ 1771 can serve to illustrate a typical application of 
abductive frameworks to the formalization of the process of explaining observations. 
Example 8.8.1. Consider an abductive framework (T, A, I) with T (representing the back- 
ground knowledge of a reasoning agent) consisting of 
grass-is-wet + rained-last-night 
grass-is-wet t sprinkler-was-on 
shoes-are-wet +- grass-is-wet, 
the set A = (rained-last-night, sprinkler-was-on) of abducibles and Z = 0. 
The statements of T can be viewed as propositional clauses. Their intuitive meaning 
is self-explanatory. Suppose, now, that the reasoner modeled by our abductive framework 
observes G = (shoes-are-wet). It is easy to check that the observation G has three 
explanations: 
At = {rained_Zast_night}, 
A2 = {sprinkler-was-on}, and 
A3 = {sprinkler-was-on, rained-lastnight), 
which correspond to the commonsense explanations of G. 
The existence of multiple explanations is a general characteristic of abductive reasoning, 
and the selection of “preferred” explanations is an important problem. Some kind of mini- 
mality condition seems to be a natural choice. Set-theoretic minimality will leave us with 
the first two explanations. If, later, we learn that there was no rain last night and add this fact 
to the integrity constraints I, we will have only the second explanation left. It seems that in 
some commonsense arguments, more complicated preference relations on explanations are 
used. The discovery and investigation of such relations are an interesting topic for further 
research. 
Let us now expand the story from the previous example by the following information: 
“Normally, shoes are dry.” There are several possible ways to incorporate this information 
into the abductive framework above. To better illustrate the possible use of integrity con- 
straints, let us consider a framework (II, A, It ) where II is a general logic program obtained 
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by adding to T the rules 
shoes-are-dry t not ab, 
ab t grass-is-wet, 
and It = {~(shoes-aredry A shoes-are-wet)}. 
Abductive frameworks whose first components are general logic programs are called ab- 
ductive logic programs. Since ll is no longer a first-order theory, we need a new definition 
of explanation. Various (nonequivalent) definitions can be found in the literature. (For a 
comparison of several of them, see [ 1051.) 
Here, we shall concentrate on the proposal by Kakas and Mancarella (based on the 
unpublished paper by Esghi and Kowalski [55]). In [ 1 IO], they develop a semantics of 
abductive logic programs closely related to the stable model semantics of the general logic 
program. 
Let (H, A, I) be an abductive logic program. A set M of ground atoms is a generalized 
stable model of (lI , A, I) if there is A c atoms (A) such that M is a stable model of H U A 
which satisfies I. We will say that M is generated by A. 
A is an explanation of an observation G if there is a generalized stable model M of 
(ll , A, I) which is generated by A and satisfies all formulas from G. 
It is easy to check that explanations of the observation G = (shoesare-wet} given 
by the program (ll , A, Zl ) according to this definition are exactly the same as that given 
by the abductive framework (T, A, I) above. Notice also that, due to the presence of the 
constraint, (ll , A, Zl) does not have a generalized stable model generated by A = { }. 
In addition to having a clear semantics for abduction, it is also important to have an 
effective method for computing abductive explanations. Theorist of [ 178, 1801 provides 
an implementation of abduction for first-order-based abductive frameworks which uses a 
resolution-based proof procedure. There are also several procedures for answering queries 
for abductive logic programs and computing abductive explanations. In [56], a basic query- 
answering procedure for abductive programs based on SLDNF resolution is defined. In 
addition to the usual yes/no answer of SLDNF, this procedure also returns an abductive 
explanation of the corresponding query. The idea was further developed in [ 111, 431, 
and [36]. The procedure is shown to be correct w.r.t. the stable model semantics for call- 
consistent logic programs, but (as pointed out in [56]) not in general. This fact led to 
modification of the procedure to achieve correctness w.r.t. the stable model semantics [222], 
as well as to work on modification of the semantics to fit the inference method of the 
procedure [ 111,431. These methods were applied to formalizations of various benchmarks 
in temporal, legal, and other types of reasoning [219,41, 601. 
There are several useful generalizations of the notion of abductive logic programs. In 
[76], abduction is combined with reasoning with classical negation and epistemic disjunc- 
tion, and generalized stable models are replaced by their answer set counterparts. In [ 104, 
1051, this work is further extended by replacing abducible literals by abducible logic pro- 
grtillls. 
8.2. Abduction and Negation as Failure 
There are some close similarities between abductive reasoning and negation as failure. The 
first attempt o make this relationship precise is due to Esghi and Kowalski. In [56], they give 
a transformation from a general logic program ll to an abductive framework (ll* , A*, Z*) 
(where H* is a Horn logic program, A* is a set of abducible predicates, and Z* is a first- 
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order theory) and show that the stable models of l-l have a one-to-one correspondence with 
the abductive extensions (as defined below) of (l-I*, A*, Z *) . 
A general logic program l-l is transformed to an abductive framework (l-I*, A*, Z*) in 
the following way:’ 
. A new predicate symbol p (the opposite of p) is introduced for each p in ll, and 
A* is the set of all these predicates. 
l A Horn theory lT* is obtained from Fl by replacing every occurrence of literals of 
the form not p(t) by p(t) (and interpreting t as an implication). 
l I* is the set of all integrity constraints of the form 
VX-[p(X) A p(X)] and 
VXMX) v P(X)1 
We say that rI* U A satisfies integrity constraints from Z if for every ground atom a from 
the language of l-l 
(a)lI*UA wuar\and 
(b)lT*UA l=uorlI*UA+C 0 
Proposition 8. I [56]. 
1. If M is a stable model of l-I, then l-l* U {ii: a is a ground atom, a 9 M) satisfies I*. 
2. If l-l* U A satisfies I*, then (a: a is a ground atom, E q! A} is a stable model of l-l.0 
The Proposition shows that an expression not p(t) in logic programs can be interpreted as 
abductive hypotheses that can be assumed to hold provided that, together with the program, 
they satisfy a canonical set of integrity constraints. 
[ 1061 and [ 1041 further investigate the relationship between abduction and negation as 
failure. In particular, they define a transformation of an abductive logic program (II, A, 0) 
into an extended logic program l-l* obtained from ll by adding two rules 
p +-not-p 
-p tnotp 
for every atom p E atoms(A). 
[ 1041 shows that, under certain natural conditions on the syntax of lT, there is a simple 
one-to-one correspondence between generalized stable models of (l-l, A, 0) and answer 
sets of l-l*. In [173], a similar transformation under the R-well-founded semantics is 
investigated. 
8.3. Combining Explanation and Deduction 
In this section, we introduce an entailment relation for abductive logic programs based 
on the notion of the generalized stable model and briefly discuss its use for knowledge 
representation.*‘We will say that an abductive logic program T entails a formula f, and 
write T /== f if f is true in all generalized stable models of T. Here, unlike in extended 
” Kakas and Mancarella use generalized stable models to define explanation for observations, and do not 
seem to have this notion of entailment mentioned explicitly. For an alternative approach based on Clark’s 
predicate completion, see, for instance, [25]. 
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logic programs, we are using the standard classical notion of a formula being true in a 
model. Accordingly, T answers yes to a query f if T ‘t= f, no if T + -f, and unknown 
otherwise. 
Example 8.8.2. To illustrate the definition, let us again consider the story of birds from 
Example 2.5. Its formalization in abductive logic programming is given by an abductive 
logic program TO, consisting of a general logic program IIu: 
1. flies(X) t bird(X), not ab(r1, X) 
2. bird(X) t penguin(X) 
3. ab(r1, X) + penguin(X), 
the set A = {penguin, bird} of abducibles, and a set I c Lit(A) of integrity constraints 
such as, say, 
I = {bird(tweety), penguin(sam)}. 
Notice that in this formalization, knowledge about particular birds is not placed in Ilo, but 
in the integrity constraints. The rules of Ilu represent general knowledge about birds and 
their flying abilities. 
Since every generalized stable model to TO must satisfy I, every such model con- 
tains penguin(sam). Hence, no generalized stable model of TO contains fiZes(sam), 
and therefore, To t= -fEies(sam). In contrast, the generalized stable model corre- 
sponding to An = (bird(tweety), penguin(sam)} contains fZies(tweety), while the 
model corresponding to At = {penguin(tLueety), penguin(sam)} does not, and there- 
fore To k fZies(tureety). Now, consider Tl obtained from To by adding to Z an integrity 
constraint -penguin(tweety). Obviously, Tl b fiZes(tweety). cl 
To understand why in the abductive approach certain positive facts are included in Z and 
not in Il, it may be useful to view an abductive logic program T = (ll, A, I) as a function 
A from 2Li’ to 2Lir defined as 
d(X) = {s: (l-l, A, Z u X) + s) 
According to this view, T is a program describing our general knowledge about the world, 
while X consists of particular observations. Then, d(X) is the set of facts (both positive 
and negative) that have to be true (according to T) whenever X is true. This use of integrity 
constraints seems to be different from the original intent in which constraints were mainly 
used to express knowledge not easily formulated in the syntax of logic programs. 
The following example further illustrates the point. 
Example 8.8.3. Consider a simpler version of the bird example (Example 2.2.5) containing 
general rules about birds. 
1. flies(X) t bird(X), not ab(r 1, X) 
2. bird(X) + penguin(X) 
3. ub(r1, X) + penguin(X) 
4. husbeuk(X) t bird(X) I 
n1 
Let A = {penguin, bird) and Z = 0. 
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Now, suppose we observe flies(a), i.e., X = (f Eies(a)}. We have two options. We 
can either include the observation as part of the integrity constraint or add it to the program 
II 1. If we follow the first option, we can use the definition of d(X) and show that 
A({ f lies(a)}) = {flies(u), bird(u), -penguin(a), hasbeak(u 
In the first option, the resulting abductive program (ll 1, A, Z U X) not only explains the ob- 
servation f iZes(u) by concluding bird(u) and -penguin(u) (which can also be achieved 
by the standard approach of abductive logic programs [55, 1 lo]), but also entials the con- 
clusion husbeuk(u), which is apparently not done by the standard approach. 
In the second option, the resulting abductive program (II 1 U X, A, I) only entails 
flies(u), and does not entail any of the new conclusions entailed in the previous 
case. 0 
Example 8.8.4. Let us now consider an extension of Tl from Example 8.8.2 by including 
information about wounded birds as in Example 3.3.2, and demonstrate how this information 
can be represented by an abductive logic program. 
Suppose that John is a wounded bird. Recall that, since the degree of John’s injury 
is unknown, the corresponding abductive program should answer unknown to the query 
f Zies( john). Obviously, postulating the exceptional status of wounded birds using a 
rule similar to (3.) does not produce the desired effect. We need some way of distin- 
guishing strong and weak exceptions to defaults. A possible solution can be obtained 
by expanding the language of T1 by two more abducible predicates-badly-wounded and 
lightly-wounded-and by introducing the following rules: 
5. woundedbird + badly-wounded(X) 
6. woundedbird + lightly-wounded(X) 
7. ub(rl, X) t budZy_wounded(X) 
8. bird(X) t wounded-bird(X) 
Consider the abductive program T2 consisting of rules 1-8 with 
Z = {wounded_bird(john), -penguin(john), 
- (badly-wounded A lightly-wounded)} and 
A = {penguin, bird, lightly-wounded, badly-wounded}. 
To satisfy wounded-bird(john) from I, the program must assume Zightly-wounded or 
badly-wounded. In the first case, John will be able to fly (by rule l), while in the second 
one, he will not (by rule 7) and therefore T2 answers unknown to the query f Zies(john). 
This methodology is, of course, rather general, and can be applied to any weak exception 
to an arbitrary default. cl 
Example 8.8.5 [147]. In our next example, we consider an abductive logic program for 
the Yale shooting problem from Example 2.2.6. It consists of axioms (l)-(5) below: 
1. hoZds(F, so) t initially(F) 
2. hoZds(F, res(A, S)) t hoZds(F, S), not ub(A, F, S) 
3. hoZds(Zouded, res(Zoud, S)) t 
4. ub(Zoud, loaded, S) t 
5. ub(shoot, alive, S) + hoZds(Zouded, S) 
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with A = {initially} and the integrity constraints containing knowledge about the initial 
situation, say, 
z = (hoZds(aZiue, so), -hoZds(Zoaded, so)} 
It is easy to see that the resulting program entails 
hoZds(aZiue, res(shoot, so)) and -hoZds(aZiue, res(shoot, res(Zoad, so))). 
It is possible to show that if information about the initial situation is complete, this for- 
malization is equivalent to the one given in the language of general logic programs. But it 
also works well if our knowledge is incomplete. Let us assume, for instance, that we 
have no information about whether or not the gun is initially loaded. Assuming that 
all other information is unchanged, we can obtain the representation of the new situa- 
tion by removing -hoZds(Zouded, so) from the old integrity constraints. The new pro- 
gram still entails -hoZds(uZiue, res(shoot, res(Zoud, so))), but remains undecided about 
hoZds(uZiue, res(shoot, so)). This is, of course, inexpressible in the classical paradigm. 
If we learned about an additional integrity constraint, say, -hoZds(uZiue, res(shoot, so)) 
then the resulting system entails initiuZZy(Zouded). Hence, by rule I., it also entails 
hoZds(Zouded, SO), which can be viewed as an explanation of I. 0 
We hope that the above discussion shows that abductive logic programming provides us 
with a viable alternative to more traditional extensions of logic programming. More work, 
however, is needed to better understand the role played by abduction in commonsense 
reasoning and the degrees to which various semantics of abductive programs reflect this 
role (or roles). We also need some additional insights into the mechanisms of preferring one 
explanation to another, into the use of integrity constraints, into computational mechanisms 
associated with abduction, and the relationship between abductive programs and other 
extensions of logic programming discussed in this paper. 
The notion of an abductive framework and its applications to explanations, causal rea- 
soning, diagnoses, and other reasoning tasks was widely studied in AI ([177, 178,34,203], 
among many others). Even though there is some obvious flow of ideas between this work 
and the work in abductive logic programming (for instance, the relation between abduction 
and negation as failure was influenced by Poole’s [178] Theorist, which showed for the 
first time how abduction could be applied to default reasoning), much can be gained from 
a better understanding between the two approaches. 
9. RELATING LOGIC PROGRAMMING AND OTHER 
NONMONOTONIC FORMALISMS 
In this section, we will briefly discuss the relationship between the logic programming- 
based formalisms discussed in the previous sections and various nonmonotonic logics (for 
a review, see [202]) developed in artificial intelligence, such as circumscription [143], 
default logic [200], and autoepistemic logic [ 1571. Even though some affinity between logic 
programs and nonmonotonic logics was recognized rather early [201, 1231, the intensive 
work in this direction started in 1987 after the discovery of model-theoretic semantics for 
stratified logic programs [6]. Almost immediately after this notion was introduced, stratified 
logic programs were mapped into the three major nonmonotonic formalisms investigated 
at that time: circumscription [125, 1871, autoepistemic logic [74], and default theories [ 11, 
1621. Research in this area was stimulated by the workshop on Foundations of Deductive 
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Databases and Logic Programming [ 1541 and by the workshops on Logic Programming 
and Nonmonotonic Reasoning [168, 1791. A collection of important papers can also be 
found in the forthcoming special issue of Journal of Logic Programming devoted to “logic 
programming and nonmonotonic reasoning.” This issue includes a recent overview on the 
relations between logic programming and nonmontonic reasoning [ 1551, and an article on 
performing nonmonotonic reasoning with logic programming [ 1701. 
This direction of research proved to be fruitful for logic programming, as well as for 
artificial intelligence. The results uncovered deep similarities between various, seemingly 
different, approaches to formalization of nonmonotonic reasoning. They helped to better 
understand the nature of negation as failure as a new nonmonotonic operator, and led to the 
development of the stable model and other similar semantics of logic programs, as well as to 
the development of extensions of traditional logic programming with disjunction and modal 
operators, which apparently do not have obvious counterparts in “classical” nonmonotonic 
formalisms. All this greatly contributed to the better understanding and appreciation of the 
representational power of logic programming. 
On the other hand, logic programming also had a significant impact on the development 
of nonmonotonic logic. It not only helped to single out important classes of theories such as 
stratified autoepistemic theories and their variants, with comparatively good computational 
and other properties, but also led to the development of new versions of basic formalisms, 
such as “default theories” [ 140, 1851, disjunctive defaults [84], reflexive autoepistemic logic 
[214], introspective circumscription [ 1261, and MBNF [ 128, 1361, to mention only a few. 
Many of these formalisms are new, and we are in the beginning stages of evaluating their 
utility to knowledge representation, but their role in gaining a much better understanding 
of commonsense reasoning cannot be seriously disputed. 
In what follows, we will briefly discuss some of these results. Results relating logic pro- 
grams with different semantics to various modifications of original nonmonotonic theories 
can be found in [174, 1911, among others. 
9. I. Autoepistemic Logic and Logic Programming 
We will start with an autoepistemic logic [ 1571 whose formulas are built from propositional 
atoms using propositional connectives and the modal operator B. 
DeJinition 9.1. For any sets T and E of autoepistemic formulas, E is said to be a stable 
expansion of T iff 
E = Cn(T U (Bq5: q5 E E} U (1B@: @ $ E)) 
where Cn is a propositional consequence operator. 0 
Intuitively, T is a theory, the elements of T are its axioms, and E is a possible model of the 
world together with the reasoner’s beliefs. A formula F is said to be true in T if F belongs 
to all stable expansions of T. If T does not contain the modal operator B, T has a unique 
stable expansion [163]. We will denote this expansion by T/z(T). 
Let c! be a mapping [74] which takes a general logic program II, and translates its rules 
(of the form (7)) into autoepistemic formulas of the form A 1 A . . . A A, A 1 B Am+1 A . . . A 
-B A,, > Ao, where B is the belief operator of autoepistemic logic. In [74], it was shown 
that the declarative semantics of stratified logic programs can be characterized in terms of 
the autoepistemic theory obtained by this transformation, and that, therefore, negation as 
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failure can be understood as an epistemic operator. The stronger result establishes a one-to- 
one correspondence between the stable models of an arbitrary general logic program lT and 
the stable expansions of a(fI). Other mappings of logic programs into autoepistemic logic 
and its variants were investigated in [162, 126,214, and 1351, but none of these mappings 
seems to extend in a natural way to logic programs with classical negation and disjunction. 
Recently, several such mappings were independently found by several researchers [138, 
164,281. The mapping fi from [ 129 and 281 translates rules of a disjunctive logic program 
fI (of the form (19)) into autoepistemic formulas of the form 
(Lk+l A B Lk+l) A.. . A (15, A B L,) A -B Lm+l A.. . A -B L, 
> (Lo A B Lo) V (B Lk A Lk). 
We now state the relationship between the disjunctive logic program fI and the autoepistemic 
theory #I(n). 
Proposition 9.1 [129, 281. For any disjunctive database fI, and any set A of literals in 
the language of IT, A is an answer set of fl iff Th(A) is a stable expansion of B(n). 
Moreover, every stable expansion of fi (l-I) can be represented in the above form. 0 
There are similar results describing mappings of disjunctive databases into reflexive 
autoepistemic logic [214] and a logic of minimal belief and negation as failure called 
MBNF [ 139, 1371. 
9.2. Defaults and Logic Programming 
A default is an expression of the form 
F tG:MHl,...,MHk, (22) 
where F, G, HI, . . . , Hk (k ? 0) are quantifier-free formulas.22 F is the consequent of the 
default, G is its prerequisite, and HI, . . . , Hk are its justijications. MH is interpreted as 
“it is consistent to believe H.” A default theory is a set of defaults. 
The operator r~ associated with a default theory D is defined as follows: for any set of 
sentences E, ro (E) is the smallest set of sentences such that 
(i) for any ground instance (22) of any default from D, if G E ro(E) and -Hi, . . . , 
-Hk $ E, then F E ro(E); 
(ii) ro (E) is deductively closed. 
E is an extension for D if ro (E) = E. Extensions of a default theory D play a role similar 
to that of stable expansions of autoepistemic theories. The simple mapping from extended 
logic programs to default theories identifies a rule 
Lo t Ll, . . .) Lm, not Lm+l, . . . , not L, 
with the default 
LotL1~...~L,:M~,,,+ ,...., ME,,, (23) 
22We limit ourselves to the quantifier-free case. For an interesting discussion on defaults with quantifiers, 
see [127]. 
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where ,? stands for the literal complementary to L. Every extended program is identified in 
this way with some default theory. It is clear that a default theory is an extended program if 
and only if each of its justifications and consequents is a literal, and each of its preconditions 
is a conjunction of literals. 
Proposition 9.2 [al]. For any extended program ll, 
(i) if S is an answer set of Il, then the deductive closure of S is an extension of II; 
(ii) every extension of Il is the deductive closure of exactly one answer set of Il. 
Thus, the deductive closure operator establishes a one-to-one correspondence between the 
answer sets of a program and its extensions. This result is a simple extension of results from 
[ 1 I] and [ 1621. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is not easily generalized to disjunctive 
databases. One of the problems in finding a natural translation from such databases into 
default theories is related to the inability to use defaults with empty justifications in reasoning 
by cases: the default theory consisting of the defaults p t q: , p t r:, and q v r t 
does not have an extension containing p, and therefore does not entail p. This property 
accounts for the difficulty in formalizing Example 4.2 in default logic. It is easy to see that 
its disjunctive logic program counterpart entails p. 
9.3. Truth Maintenance Systems and Logic Programming 
Finally, we will briefly discuss the relationship between logic programs and nonmonotonic 
truth maintenance systems (TMSs) [42]. Systems of this sort, originally described by pro- 
cedural (and sometimes rather complicated) means, commonly serve as inference engines 
of AI reasoning systems. We will follow a comparatively simple description of TMSs from 
[58]. We will need the following terminology: a justrfication is a set of directed proposi- 
tional clauses of the form cx A /I > c where c is an atom, cr is a conjunction of atoms, and b 
is a conjunction of negated atoms. By an interpretation, we will mean a set of atoms. The 
justification cx A /I > c supports the atom c w.r.t. an interpretation A4 if CY A /? is true in M. 
A model M of a set of justifications Il is grounded if it can be written M = (cl, . . . , c,} 
such that each cj has at least one justification a! A j3 > cj that supports it whose positive 
antecedents a! are a subset of {cl, . . . , cj_1 }. The task of a nonmonotonic TMS is to find a 
grounded model of a set of justifications Il. The form of justifications suggests the obvious 
analogy with rules of logic programs where negated literals -A from j!? are replaced by 
not A. Let us denote the corresponding logic program by lI*. The following theorem 
establishes the relationship between ThKSs and logic programs: 
Proposition 9.3 (581. M is a grounded model of a collection of justifications Il iff it is a 
stable model of a program II*. 
Similar results were obtained in [239, 85, 176, 2061, and [64]. (The last two papers use 
autoepistemic logic instead of logic programs.) They led to a better understanding of the 
semantics of nonmonotonic truth maintenance systems, to their use for computing stable 
models [59] and autoepistemic extensions [ 1071, for doing abductive reasoning [106,209], 
and to the development of variants of TMSs based on other semantics of logic programs. A 
good description of one such system, based on the well-founded semantics, together with 
the proof of its tractability can be found in [241]. 
C. BARAL AND M. GELFOND 
10. EXPRESSIVENESS AND COMPLEXITY RESULTS 
In this section, we will briefly discuss the complexity and expressibility of logic program- 
ming languages. In [215], a survey containing most of the recent results is provided.23 
Apart from the theoretical appeal, complexity and expressiveness results for logic pro- 
gramming are significant for practice. Characterizations of the complexity of logic program- 
ming formalisms allow us to get insight into computational obstacles for designing efficient 
programs. Furthermore, by the well-developed theory of structural complexity, we often 
can derive immediate results on the possibility of simulating one formalism by another. 
Complexity is closely related to expressiveness which, roughly speaking, measures the 
class of relations that a logic programming formalism can express. Expressiveness results 
show up limitations on the applicability of logic programming formalisms for describing 
particular problems, 
We will assume some familiarity with complexity theory. 
Let us start with the language of propositional general logic programs. The main com- 
plexity problem we will discuss is the decision problem formulated as follows: given a logic 
program ll and a literal 1, determine whether 1 is a consequence of Il in the given semantics. 
By 1 II 1 and 1 P ] we will denote the number of rules and the number of propositional letters 
in II, respectively. Then the following holds: 
Theorem 10.1. 
(a) The decision problem for stratiBed l7 is 0 (I ll I) cfollows from [38]), 
(b) the decision problem for I7 under completion semantics and under stable model 
semantics is co-N P complete ([I 161 and [I 631, respectively), and 
(c) the decision problem for lI under three-valued program completion semantics and 
under the well-founded semantics is 0 (I l3 I> and 0 (I ll I> * ( P 1, respectively (folk- 
lore). 0 
Let us now consider programs with variables. The above results are, of course, only 
meaningful for such programs if their ground instantiations consist of a finite number 
of clauses. In the general case, we can only talk about definability of relations defined 
by logic programs. Recursion-theoretic characterization of such definability provides us 
with insights into the expressive power of logic programming languages under different 
semantics. 
Let us first introduce the necessary terminology: 
Definition 10.1. A relation s on the set of ground terms of a language C is dejinable in logic 
programming under semantics + if there exists a program Il and predicate symbol p in 
the language ,C such that, for every ground term t of L, 
s(t) s Il + p(t) or s(t) = l7 + -p(t). 0 
To discuss the expressive power of logic programs, we will need the following classification 
of formulas of second-order arithmetic, i.e., arithmetic with quantifiers over sets of natural 
numbers [221]. Variables for such sets will be denoted by Xs and Ys. 
Definition 10.2. A formula is ZZ: (II!) if it is of the form 3XF (VXF) where F is a 
23 [35] contains a survey on complexity results for nonmonotonic logics. 
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 133 
first-order formula. A formula is lIi if it is of the form VXjYF where F is first 
order. 0 
It is well known that general C; formulas are far more expressive than first-order for- 
mulas, and general II: formulas are far more expressive than general C 1’ formulas, and so 
on. 
Dejlnition 10.3. A set s of natural numbers is C{ (l-l;) definable if it satisfies Vn(s(n) = 
Q(n)) where formula @ is C: (II:). 0 
The following theorem [213, 1561 characterizes the expressibility of the stable model 
semantics of logic programs over natural numbers 
Theorem 10.2 [213, 1561. A set s of natural numbers is l-If definable tIs is definable by 
a logic program under the stable model semantics. 0 
The actual results of [213, 1561, and [l] are stronger than the above theorem. Instead 
of definability of sets of natural numbers, these papers deal with definability over arbitrary 
infinite Herbrand universes. Moreover, they show that the problem of determining if a literal 
1 is a stable model consequence of a program Il is Ilt complete, i.e., is representative of the 
hardest decision problem in Ill. As shown in [233, 1161, and [66], the same result holds for 
the well-founded semantics, as well as for two-valued and three-valued completion-based 
semantics of logic programs. 
The following results demonstrate the decrease in expressive power caused by additional 
restrictions on the classes of logic programs under consideration: 
Theorem 10.3 [1.56]. A set s of natural numbers is dejnable by a logic program with a 
unique stable model iff s is At, i.e., s and its complement are “‘1 definable. 0 
It is known that A! is strictly smaller than Il !, but is still highly nonrecursive. The 
complexity is further decreased if we limit ourselves to stratified programs. 
Theorem 10.4 [I]. A sets of natural numbers is definable by a stratified logic program iff 
s is definable by a$rst-order arithmetic formula. 0 
The above theorem implies that any semantics of arbitrary logic programs is uncom- 
putable whenever the semantics agrees with the perfect model semantics on stratified pro- 
grams. 
There are other interesting ways of measuring complexity of logic programs. We mention 
a measure, applicable to first-order logic programs without function symbols, called data 
complexity. As in the theory of deductive databases, we will think of a logic program 
as consisting of two parts: a database of facts, plus a set of rules for inferring additional 
information. More precisely, we assume that the set of all predicate symbols of C is 
partitioned into the set called EDB, or extensional relations, and the set IDB, or intensional 
relations. The database of facts is formed from predicates in EDB and ground terms of ,C, 
while the heads of the rules from the “rule part” are formed from predicates in ZDB. Let 
us now fix IDB and consider the problem of checking if a ground query 1 is entailed by 
ID B U D for a given set D of EDB facts. The corresponding complexity can be viewed as 
a function of the size of D. This is called data complexity. 
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Theorem 10.5 [163]. The data complexity of logic programs without function symbols 
under the stable model semantics is co-NP complete. II 
Theorem 10.6 [233, 2341. The data complexity of logic programs without function sym- 
bols under the well-founded semantics is polynomial in the size of D. 0 
These results demonstrate that (worst-case) entailment in logic programs under the well- 
founded semantics is “computationally feasible,” while under the stable model semantics, 
it is not. To pay for this feasibility, we lose in expressiveness. For instance, with the 
stable model semantics, one can write a program which says that a propositional formula 
is satisfiable, while with the well-founded semantics, one cannot. 
We conclude this section by briefly addressing some recent complexity and expres- 
siveness results for disjunctive logic programming, where the heads of clauses may be 
disjunctions of atoms instead of single atoms (cf. [ 1331). 
The main decision problem for the language of propositional disjunctive logic programs 
(not containing -) is as for nondisjunctive programs: given a disjunctive logic program II 







The decision problem for l-l under the disjunctive database rule [210] and the 
equivalent weak generalized CWA 12051 is polynomial [27] (co-NP-complete if 
heads can be empty), 
the decision problem for n under the possible models semantics [211] and the 
equivalent possible worlds semantics [27] is polynomial (co-NP-complete again 17 
heads can be empty), 
the decision problem for l-I under the careful CWA [88] is @-hard and in 
A;[O(logn)J, and 
the decision problem for II is II; -complete for the following semantics [49, 51,521: 
the generalized CWA [153], the extendedgeneralized CWA [242], the extended CWA 
[94], the iterated CWA [94], the perfect model semantics [188], and the partial as 
well as total disjunctive stable model semantics 11951. 0 
Here, l-I! and A: [ O(log n)] are classes above COGVP (= lI[) in the refined polynomial 
hierarchy, which is a subrecursive analog to the Kleene arithmetical hierarchy (cf. [235]). 
Results for important restricted cases have been derived in [32]. For the extension of logic 
programming by classical negation [82], the following holds. 
Theorem 10.8. The decision problem for a disjunctive logic program (containing 1 ana’ 
not) II under the answer set semantics is l-l; -complete [SO]. q 
For a special but broad class of disjunctive logic programs (in particular, the headcycle- 
free programs), the decision problem under the answer set semantics is co-N P-complete 
[lOI. 
Note that similar complexity results have recently been derived for various forms of 
nonmonotonic reasoning such as default and autoepistemic logic [87], nonmonotonic S4 
[224], theory revision [48], and abduction [53]. 
For programs with variables, consider the case of first-order disjunctive logic programs 
without function symbols. Then the following holds. 
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Theorem 10.9 [.54]. 
(a) The data complexity ofjirst-order disjunctive logic programs withoutfunction sym- 
bols under stable model semantics is I-$ -complete, and 
(b) the class of$rst-order disjunctive logic programs without function symbols under 
stable semantics expresses l-L;. 0 
Notice that first-order disjunction-free logic programs without functions expresses co- 
N P [213]; hence, by allowing disjunction, the expressive power of stable models increases 
greatly. For example, with disjunction, we can write a program which determines whether 
the maximum size of a clique in a graph is odd, which is not possible by a disjunction-free 
program (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). 
11. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we considered several extensions of the language of definite logic programs, 
and demonstrated their applicability to solving a large variety of difficult knowledge repre- 
sentation problems, such as formalization of normative statements, the closed world, and 
the domain-closure assumptions and their open counterparts, as well as other types of de- 
fault and epistemic statements. We considered several examples from such diverse domains 
as reasoning in inheritance hierarchies, reasoning about result of actions, reasoning about 
knowledge and belief, reasoning about databases with incomplete information, and several 
others. 
Among other things, we tried to demonstrate: 
(4 
(b) 
that the choice of the representation language depends on the level of completeness of 
knowledge about the problem. For instance, when knowledge is assumed complete, 
the language of general logic program seems to be appropriate. When the only 
form of incompleteness is complete lack of knowledge (like missing entries in 
database tables), the language of extended logic programs seems to be the language 
of choice. Representation of various forms of partial knowledge requires disjunctive 
logic programs and their extensions or abductive frameworks; 
that the choice of particular representation of normative statements and other con- 
structs of natural language depends not only on the representation language, but also 
on the type of updates that are allowed. For example, if the only updates allowed 
by the specification are of the form q(t), the normative statement “ps are normally 
qs” is translated as 
p(X) + q(X), not aW0. 
If we allow updates consisting of literals formed with predicate p, then the above nor- 
mative statement should be translated as 
P(X) + q(X), not ah(X), not -p(X) 
Fortunately, in many cases, the more complex formalization seem to be correct extensions 
of the simpler ones [ 13,230]. The precise relationship between these different approaches 
is an interesting subject for further investigation. 
We believe that the proposed formalizations compare favorably with those given in 
traditional nonmonotonic formalisms: recall, for instance, that Example 2.2.6 poses a 
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serious problem for circumscription, and Example 4.4.2 causes difficulties for Reiter’s 
default logic. It is not clear how to represent epistemic reasoning, say from Example 5.5.1, 
in any known form of nonmonotonic modal logic. However, extended logic programming 
languages allow all these examples to be treated in a uniform fashion. 
Restrictive syntax of logic programming languages facilitates the adoption of query- 
answering methods developed in the context of traditional logic programming and deductive 
databases to more complicated forms of knowledge representation and reasoning. It also 
helps to avoid another problem associated with the use of superclassical ogics: existence 
of several natural, but nonequivalent translations from natural language statements into 
the formalism. Consider, for instance, Example 4.4.2. The simple disjunctive statement 
“Matt’s left or right hand is broken” can be translated in, say, MBNF [ 1391 as 
lh-broken v rh-broken 
or as 
B lh_broken v B rh_broken 
where B is the belief operator of MBNF. Only the second translation (probably the less 
obvious one) leads to the correct result. 
There are, of course, many remaining problems. Even though in many cases application 
of our techniques led to modular representation of knowledge,24a greater degree of modu- 
larity is desirable. It remains to be seen if this can only be achieved by limiting the types 
of updates allowed by our formalization. It is well known in the theory of data structures 
that data representation is dependent on the operations allowed on the data. Realization 
of its importance led to the developments of abstract data types. Similar considerations 
can lead to the discovery of interesting knowledge structures. It is also possible that more 
work on the methodology of representing knowledge and/or extension of the language can 
help to solve the problem of modular updates. The problem of updates is closely related 
to the more general problem of belief revision. A better understanding of this process and 
development of its mathematical models in the context of logic programming paradigms 
presents an interesting and important challenge to the logic programming community. 
Another important question which requires much more work is the development of 
query-answering systems for the new languages. Even though traditional inference meth- 
ods of Prolog and deductive databases are easily adaptable to categorical extended logic 
programs, much improvement is needed in developing methods computing well-founded, 
stable, and/or other types of semantics. Very promising work in this direction has been 
done by Pereira et al. [172], Chen and Warren [240], and others. Some of the other im- 
portant issues are to learn to deal with floundering queries and planning problems, and 
to incorporate new logic programming paradigms such as constrained logic programming 
and concurrent logic programming in the nonmonotonic framework. Extensions of the 
languages by allowing more complex data such as sets and aggregates are very important 
in database applications [ 119, 20,771. 
Even more questions remain for noncategorical programs, i.e., logic programs with 
multiple answer sets or disjunctive logic programs. In this case, one of the most important 
problems seems to be the lack of clear procedural interpretation of rules of a program. 
Such interpretation of definite logic programs which treats predicates as procedure calls 
24Formalization of knowledge is called modular if small changes in the informal knowledge base cause 
small changes in its formal counterpart. 
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION 137 
and interpreters the rule A0 t Al, . . . A,, as saying “to execute procedure A0 execute 
procedures A 1, . . . An” was suggested by Kowalski in [ 1131, and lies at the heart of the 
logic programming paradigm. It remains to be seen if a similar interpretation can be 
discovered for disjunctive logic programs and the other formalisms described in the paper. 
Another crucial direction of research is related to using extensions of logic programming 
to represent knowledge in particular domains. Theories of actions and time, representing 
null values and other forms of incomplete information in databases, legal reasoning, and 
reasoning about diagnoses, is an incomplete list of interesting examples. Building theories 
is a slow process which only succeeds if new ideas are built on the old ones. To learn how 
to do that in a careful mathematical way is one of the major challenges faced by the field. 
Finally, we would like to mention that real progress in all of these areas is tightly related to 
building a mathematical theory of declarative logic programming. We hope that the paper 
showed that such a theory, even though it is still in the stage of infancy, contains some 
nontrivial results and methods. We also hope that the paper will contribute to its further 
development. 
Many people (knowingly or unknowingly) contributed to this survey by sharing with us their views on the 
field and particular results discussed in the paper. To all of them-our deepest thanks. We would like 
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